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Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Bona Fides of a
Bona Fide Dispute
LAWRENCE PONOROFF*
INTRODUCTION
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 the bulk of the substantive
law controlling creditors' entitlement to involuntary bankruptcy relief was
consolidated into section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 Two provisions of
that statute are relevant for purposes of this Article. The first is section
303(b) which governs the issue of eligibility to file an involuntary petition.
As originally drafted, it provided that, other than in a case involving a
partnership debtor,3 authority to commence an involuntary case was limited
to creditors holding non-contingent and unsecured claims against the debtor
with an aggregate value of at least $5,000. 4
The other provision of interest is section 303(h)(1). It contains the first,
and by far the more dominant, of the two alternative grounds' upon which
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo. J.D., 1978, Stanford University;
A.B., 1975, Loyola University of Chicago. I wish to thank the Board of Editors of the Indiana
Law Journal, and particularly Ellen Boshkoff, for their able editorial assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) [hereinafter "Reform Act"]. Title I of the
Reform Act was codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). References in
this Article to the "Bankruptcy Code" or to the "Code" are to Title 11 of the United States
Code as amended through January 15, 1987 unless otherwise indicated. 11 U.S.C. (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
3. Section 303(b)(3) of the Code contains special rules governing commencement of an
involuntary case against a partnership. In addition to institution by unsecured claimholders,
an involuntary case may be initiated by any one or more general partners of a partnership.
In essence, any partnership bankruptcy commenced by less than all of the general partners is
treated as an involuntary case. See In re Memphis-Friday's Assocs., 88 Bankr. 821 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1988).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1982) (amended 1984). Refer to infra note 40 for the main text
of this provision under the Reform Act. Note that under this formulation a secured claimholder
is not disqualified from being a petitioning creditor. See Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1988). In fact, a partially secured creditor is not only
eligible to join in the petition, but also, to the extent of the difference between the amount
of its claim and the value of its collateral, to have its claim count towards the $5,000 claims
floor which the petitioners collectively must meet. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) regarding the
distinction between secured and unsecured claims for bankruptcy purposes.
5. The other ground for relief, which is a carryover from prior law, requires a showing
that a "custodian" was appointed or authorized to take possession of all or substantially all
of the debtor's property within 120 days of the filing of the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2)
(1982). The term "custodian" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (1982). The incorporation of
this provision essentially allows creditors who act promptly to preempt most state and other
non-bankruptcy insolvency proceedings in favor of liquidation or reorganization under the
Code. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 323-24 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AzmN. NEws 5963, 6279-80.
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involuntary relief may be granted once the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court has been properly invoked under section 303(b). 6 Under the Reform
Act version of section 303(h)(1), if the debtor controverted the petition,7
relief could not be ordered against the debtor unless the petitioners could
show that, as of the date of filing, the debtor was generally not paying its
debts as they became due.'
In 1984, as part of the revisions to the Code effected by Title III of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,1 Congress
amended the Reform Act's requirements for involuntary bankruptcy by
inserting identical language in sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1) which excludes
for both purposes claims and debts subject to a "bona fide dispute."' 0
These parallel amendments became effective immediately upon the enactment
of the 1984 Act, and applied to all cases pending or filed after that date."
The legislative history of the 1984 Act makes clear that, in amending
section 303, Congress was reacting to a concern that the threat of involuntary
bankruptcy might be used as a tool to bludgeon a debtor into payment of
dubious claims or satisfaction of obligations open to legitimate question. 2
At the same time, legislators hoped that these changes would resolve the
ambiguity which had arisen in the case law under the Reform Act regarding
the proper treatment of disputed debts in involuntary bankruptcies. 3
6. The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to consider the merits of an involuntary petition is
invoked by the filing of a petition by the requisite number of creditors holding qualified claims
in the required amount. See In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126, 131 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); see also infra notes 40-41 and accompanying
text for discussion of the specific creditor qualification requirements under the Reform Act.
At present, it is sufficient to observe that the relationship between §§ 303(b) and 303(h)
operates essentially as follows: If the debtor is successfully able to challenge one or more
creditors' standing under § 303(b), the petition is improper and the court never reaches the
issue under § 303(h) of whether or not the facts support entry of an order for relief.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982) provides, in pertinent part: "If the petition is not timely
controverted, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the
chapter under which the petition was filed." Id. However, an involuntary case may only be
commenced under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1982) (amended 1984). The full text of § 303(h)(1) under the
Reform Act is reprinted infra note 43.
9. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) [hereinafter "1984 Act"].
10. See § 426(b) of the 1984 Act.
11. Section 553(b) of the 1984 Act dealt specifically with the effective date of the amend-
ments made by § 426(b). See also In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 747-48 (7th Cir. 1987) (Congress
intended the 1984 amendments to § 303 to become effective immediately as of the date the
1984 Act was passed: July 10, 1984.).
12. See infra note 99 and accompanying text for citation and discussion of the relevant
legislative history to the 1984 Act.
13. Prior to the 1984 Act, the courts were divided over the issue of whether the existence
of a good faith dispute was sufficient to either bar a creditor from eligibility to seek involuntary
relief or exclude a debt from among the count of the debtor's unpaid obligations, or both.
In part, this discord could be attributed to the absence of specific statutory guidance on the
matter. Case law under the Reform Act is reviewed infra notes 52-98 and accompanying text.
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One of the purposes of this Article is to demonstrate that an unfortunate
and ironic by-product of the 1984 Act's amendments to section 303 has
been the replacement of prior judicial disagreement over the treatment of
disputed debts with an even greater divergence of opinion over the guidelines
for identifying the presence or absence of a bona fide dispute. It will also
be argued that, without appreciably enhancing debtors' protections from
abusive filings, the statutory exclusion of disputed debts from involuntary
bankruptcy analysis has tilted the balance in contested cases so as to unduly
restrict access to involuntary bankruptcy relief and, thereby, unfairly limit
its utility as a creditors' remedy. Finally, this Article will suggest an
alternative approach for analyzing the bona fides of a disputed claim under
sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1) based on the premise that the relevant standards
should differ depending upon the context in which the issue arises.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Early History
The creditor qualification requirements and the appropriate circumstances
for relief under section 303 ultimately must be evaluated against the back-
drop of the essential purposes sought to be served through involuntary
bankruptcy. Therefore, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of
the historical antecedents to the current Code provisions.
Initially, it is important to appreciate that, while widely regarded as a
"debtor's remedy," federal bankruptcy law does not really take sides. To
the contrary, providing creditors with a more efficient and equitable method
of debt collection has always been at least as important an objective of
bankruptcy policy as providing debtors with relief from burdensome debt. 4
Consequently, when debtor or creditor conduct threatens to unfairly deplete
value, and thereby undermine equal treatment of similarly positioned cred-
itors, core bankruptcy policy dictates that creditors be able to compel the
liquidation or reorganization of the debtor's estate through a federal bank-
ruptcy proceeding.5
14. For example, Dean Jackson describes bankruptcy law, at its core, as a collectivized
debt-collection device for claimants of an insolvent debtor which exists as an alternative to
"state grab" remedies. As such, he observes that, when measured from the perspective of the
creditor body as a whole, bankruptcy represents a superior method for maximizing the total
pool of assets available for distribution under the mandatory scheme of bankruptcy priorities.
T. JACKSON, TEE LooIc AND Lns OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 (1986). See also Jackson &
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor's
Bargain, 75 VA. L. Ray. 155 (1989), in which the authors expand on the original creditor's
bargain explanation of the bankruptcy system to take into account the hypothetical agreement
of creditors to share in the risks of business failure.
15. The circumstance most frequently motivating involuntary filings is the making by the
debtor of a large, preferential transfer of property to a single creditor, resulting in a net
depletion of assets available to satisfy the claims of remaining creditors. See generally S.
SNUDER & L. PONORO , COMSRCIAL BANKRupTcY LrnoATION § 5.06 (1989).
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In fact, the earliest bankruptcy law in the United States' 6 conformed with
the prevailing English practice at the time'7 in that it was exclusively a
creditors' tool, and not a means for a debtor to voluntarily seek relief
through discharge. 8 Subsequent national legislation in 1841 and 1867 pro-
vided for voluntary debtor filings and the discharge of debts. However,
also allowing creditors under certain circumstances to initiate an involuntary
proceeding against the debtor was an idea that persisted throughout the
development of federal bankruptcy law during the nineteenth century.' 9
B. The 1898 Act
Bankruptcy law for most of this century was governed by the National
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which survived until repealed by the Reform Act.20
The Bankruptcy Act established strict and detailed conditions which creditors
were required to satisfy in order to compel an involuntary bankruptcy
administration. As to the threshold issue of standing to properly initiate a
case, the Bankruptcy Act required that the petitioning creditors be the
holders of "provable claims" against the debtor. The claims had to be non-
contingent as to liability and certain in amount, aggregating to at least $500
in excess of the value of any security held by such creditors. 2' The notion
of a "provable claim" 22 had a connotation different from what one might
16. The first national bankruptcy act was passed by Congress in 1800, 2 Stat. 19 (1800),
and applied only to traders and other intermediaries. It was repealed three years later. 2 Stat.
248 (1803). See generally A. SELVERSTONE, BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1 (1940); C.
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES 13-14 (1935).
17. For discussion of early English bankruptcy law, which formed the pattern for the first
federal bankruptcy act, see Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM.
L.J. 226 (1976).
18. The relatively recent origins of voluntary bankruptcy, and the historical developments
in the first half of the 19th Century which accounted for its adoption at the federal level, are
insightfully analyzed in McCoid, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BxAN. DEv. J. 361
(1988). See also C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 49-92.
19. See Bankruptcy Act 1841, chs. 1, 4, 5, 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441-43, repealed by Act of
March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act 1867, ch. 176, §§ 11, 37, 39, 14 Stat.
521, 535-36, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99. For detailed discussion of national
bankruptcy law during this period, see generally C. WARREN, supra note 16.
20. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(repealed 1979) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Act" or "Act"].
21. See Bankruptcy Act § 59b. Like the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act fixed the
number of creditors required to join in an involuntary petition in order to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court by reference to whether or not the debtor had twelve or more arms-length
creditors. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) with Bankruptcy Act
§§ 59b, 59e. See also infra note 41 and accompanying text. Under the Act, every natural
person, except a wage-earner or a farmer, and most business corporations, could be forced
into a bankruptcy proceeding. See Bankruptcy Act § 4b.
22. The concept of provability was relevant for a variety of purposes under the Bankruptcy
Act beyond the question of who could be a valid petitioning creditor. The Act also employed
it in determining whether particular creditors would be entitled to share in distributions in a
bankruptcy case, Bankruptcy Act §§ 65c, 57d, and whether a claim would be affected by the
debtor's discharge, Bankruptcy Act § 17a.
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expect. Rather than requiring the establishment of the merits of a contested
claim by proper evidence, the concept of provability turned wholly on the
nature and subject matter of the claim. The Act enumerated nine separate
classes or types of claims that would be considered "provable" for purposes
of a bankruptcy case.23
Although contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities were
generally included among the categories of provable claims under the Act, 24
contingent claim holders were statutorily proscribed under section 59b from
compelling the debtor's bankruptcy. Moreover, proof of a valid defense to
an alleged claim was generally sufficient to render the claim not provable
under the Act.? Thus, as a practical matter, a claim had to be non-
contingent, unliquidated, 26 and, by and large, undisputed, before it conferred
on its holder standing to seek involuntary bankruptcy against the debtor.
An even greater impediment to the widespread use of the involuntary
bankruptcy remedy under the Act was the standards to which petitioning
creditors were held in order to prevail on the merits. Before a debtor could
be adjudged a bankrupt, the Act required that the petitioning creditors
prove that the debtor had committed one or more of the six enumerated
"acts of bankruptcy." 27 Many of these acts, even if committed, were difficult
to detect and toilsome to prove. Often, this meant that by the time creditors
were successful in demonstrating the need for bankruptcy protection, assets
23. Bankruptcy Act § 63a.
24. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(8). However, although provable, by virtue of § 57d contingent
debts and claims would not be allowed unless they were capable of reasonable estimation.
25. For example, under the Bankruptcy Act, tort claims were only deemed provable if they
had been reduced to judgment or if the claimant had filed an action on the claim prior to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(l), (7); see also In re All Media
Properties, 5 Bankr. 126, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981),
and authorities cited therein. But see Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4) which provided that unadjudi-
cated claims founded upon an open account or an express or implied contract could be proved
and allowed against the estate.
26. Actually, the original version of § 59b of the Bankruptcy Act only required that the
petitioners' claims be provable. The Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 868 (1938), added
the requirement that the claims be "fixed as to liability and liquidated as to amount." The
term "fixed" was changed to "non-contingent" by the Act of July 7, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-
456, 66 Stat. 420, 425. The Act of September 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-681, 76 Stat. 570,
571, dropped the reference to "liquidated" and added language that a claim or claims,
if unliquidated, shall not be counted in computing the number and the aggregate
amount of the claims of the creditors joining in the petition, if the court
determines that the claim or claims cannot be readily determined or estimated to
be sufficient, together with the claims of the other creditors, to aggregate $500,
without unduly delaying the decision upon the adjudication.
Id. For more extensive discussion on the history of § 59b, see Kennedy, Bankruptcy Legislation
of 1962, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 241, 250 (1963).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 3a classified the "acts of bankruptcy" as follows: (1) Fraudulent
conveyances; (2) Preferential transfers, while insolvent; (3) Liens through legal proceedings,
while insolvent; (4) Assignment for the benefit of creditors; (5) Appointment of a receiver,
while insolvent or unable to pay debts; and (6) Written admission of inability to pay debts
and willingness to be adjudged bankrupt. 30 Stat. 546 (1898).
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that were part of the estate had been dissipated or concealed. The rigor of
the petitioner's task was magnified by the fact that the court only had
jurisdiction over the involuntary petition if it was filed within four months
after commission of the offending act of bankruptcy.28
An element common to four of the six designated acts of bankruptcy2 9
was proof of insolvency either at the time the act was committed or, in the
case of a fraudulent transfer,30 at any time thereafter and at the time of
filing." For this purpose, the Act defined insolvency in the "balance sheet"
sense as assets, at fair valuation, insufficient in amount to satisfy liabilities.32
In addition to the fact that such a determination often could not be made
without the benefit of information exclusively in the possession of the
debtor, this requirement also compounded creditors' dilemma by introducing
difficult issues of valuation into the process.
Professor MacLachlan, an influential contemporary commentator, vehe-
mently complained that the Act's failure to embrace the alternative "equity
sense" measurement of insolvency-inability to pay debts as they mature33-
unfairly prejudiced creditors, without any compensating benefit to debtors,
by detrimentally delaying creditors' rights to seek and obtain involuntary
bankruptcy relief until in many cases the debtor's financial condition had
deteriorated beyond the point of no return.3 4 He further observed that the
28. See Bankruptcy Act § 3b.
29. Technically, where the act of bankruptcy consisted of either an assignment for the
benefit of creditors or a consent to bankruptcy, proof of insolvency was not required.
Bankruptcy Act § 3a(4), (6). Practically speaking, however, in most cases it would be present
anyway. Additionally, under § 3a(6), the debtor was required to admit an inability to pay its
debts as well as its willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt. Thus, at some level, insolvency
was a factor in virtually all involuntary bankruptcy cases.
30. Bankruptcy Act § 3a(l).
31. If the creditor alleged the first act of bankruptcy (fraudulent conveyance), there was
no requirement that the debtor be insolvent at the time of the conveyance. However, it was
necessary that the debtor be insolvent at the time of filing. See Bankruptcy Act § 3c, which
provided a complete defense to an involuntary petition based upon proof of the alleged
bankrupt's solvency at the time of the filing against him. Of course, this defense was limited
to cases involving creditor petitions alleging a fraudulent conveyance as the basis for having
the debtor adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. See West v. Lea Co., 174 U.S. 590, 592-98
(1899).
32. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(19).
33. Equity sense insolvency was recognized and employed under the Bankruptcy Act in a
number of contexts, including as an alternative element to the balance sheet insolvency
requirement under the fifth act of bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act § 3a(5), and in connection
with the eligibility requirements for Railroad Reorganizations, Bankruptcy Act § 77a, Municipal
Debt Readjustments, Bankruptcy Act § 323, Real Property Arrangements, Bankruptcy Act §
423, and Wage Earner's Plans, Bankruptcy Act § 623.
34. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 12-14 (1956). Professor
MacLachlan argued that the Act's stubborn insistence on defining insolvency in the balance
sheet sense of assets at fair valuation less than debts, not only reflected a misguided solicitude
for the protection of debtors, but ignored the commercial reality that the downward spiral
into financial oblivion inevitably begins when the debtor falls to pay its debts. Id. at 56-58;
see also McCoid, The Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1987)
(addressing the issue of which definition of insolvency represents the most appropriate standard
for involuntary bankruptcy).
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practical consequence of requiring that an act of bankruptcy be established,
particularly when coupled with the Act's adoption of the balance sheet test
of solvency, was "a weakening of the bankruptcy law in relation to its
important function of doing equity between creditors. '35
II. Tim BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
Over time, the array of barriers which the Bankruptcy Act constructed
in the path of creditors desiring to initiate an involuntary bankruptcy case
came under increasingly heavy criticism.3 6 In 1970, Congress established the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ("Bankruptcy Com-
mission") to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend changes to [existing
bankruptcy law]."137 The Bankruptcy Commission's work served as the
foundation for several proposed bankruptcy reform bills, including the bill
that was eventually enacted into law in 1978.
In its 1973 report,3" the Bankruptcy Commission responded sympatheti-
cally to the complaints voiced by Professor MacLachlan and others regarding
the unhappy state of involuntary bankruptcy under the Act. It recommended
a thorough overhaul of the current system for involuntary relief, including
abandonment of the "complex, litigation-producing constraints" which had
accounted for widespread "creditor dissatisfaction and lack of interest in
the bankruptcy system." 3 9 Accordingly, in the original drafting of the
Bankruptcy Code, the standards for involuntary bankruptcy were relaxed
dramatically by eliminating many of the technical requirements and difficult
issues of proof which had characterized the practice and procedures under
the Bankruptcy Act.
In terms of jurisdictional prerequisites, section 303(b) expunged any
reference to provability and, except to the limited extent of establishing the
minimum $5,000 claims amount requirement, included the holders of unli-
quidated claims within the ambit of entities eligible to petition for invol-
untary bankruptcy relief.40 Section 303(b) also left intact the Act's rule that
35. J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 34, at 57.
36. See, e.g., id. at 53-65; Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977,
33 Bus. LAW. 489, 504-05 (1978); Morgan, Section 59b of the Chandler Act: An Impediment
to Involuntary Bankruptcy Proceedings, 37 ILL. L. REv. 215 (1943).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
38. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF TmE UNTED STATES, REPORT OF THE
COMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1973). The Report was issued in two parts: Part I contained findings and
recommendations, and Part II proposed a reform bill [hereinafter Part I of this report referred
to as BANKRUPTCY COMMIssIoN REPORT].
39. BANKRUPTCY COI.nSSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 186-88.
40, The Reform Act version of what was originally codified in 1979 as 11 U.S.C. §
303(b)(1) read, in pertinent part, as follows:
An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the
1990]
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the required number of petitioning creditors would be reduced from three
to one if the total of the debtor's unsecured creditors (exclusive of certain
categories of creditors considered sympathetic to the debtor) numbered less
than twelve. 41 Additionally, the Code limited the category of persons exempt
from involuntary bankruptcy to farmers and not-for-profit corporations. 42
Concerning the grounds for relief, the Reform Act totally abandoned the
earlier requirement that the debtor be adjudicated as having committed an
act of bankruptcy. Instead, section 303(h)(1) permitted proof of equity
insolvency-defined as the debtor's general failure to pay its debts as they
become due-as alone a sufficient basis for involuntary relief.43 Therefore,
the Reform Act appreciably lightened the burden for creditors seeking to
establish entitlement to involuntary relief and, for that reason, facilitated
bankruptcy court of a petition...
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is ... a holder of a claim against
such person that is not contingent as to liability ... if such claims aggregate at
least $5,000 more than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing
such claims held by the holders of such claims.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982) (encompassing within the definition of a "claim," any
right to payment, without regard to whether or not such right has been reduced to judgment,
and expressly inclusive of unliquidated, unmatured, contingent and disputed rights to payment).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (1982). The categories of creditors excluded from the count
include: (1) employees of the debtor; (2) "insiders" of the debtor, as defined in 11 U.S.C. §
101(30) (Supp. IV 1986); and (3) creditors having received a transfer or interest in property
of the debtor that is avoidable by the trustee. See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b) (liberal
rules for the post-filing joinder of petitioners where the debtor alleges the existence of twelve
or more creditors in response to a single creditor petition).
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982) (amended to include "family farmers" by 11 U.S.C. §
101(18) (1986)). Compare Bankruptcy Act, supra note 20, § 4b.
43. The Reform Act version of what was originally codified in 1979 as 11 U.S.C. §
303(h)(1) read as follows: "The Court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary
case ... only if (1) The debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts
become due."
Note that this formulation of equity insolvency differs from the test of equity insolvency as
it had been used under the Bankruptcy Act because it is satisfied upon a showing that the
debtor generally is not paying its debts instead of requiring proof of an inability to pay. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text for discussion of equity sense insolvency under the Act.
The language in § 303(h)(1), as originally enacted, represented a compromise between the
House and Senate versions of the Reform Act. See 124 CONG. REc. 33,992-93 (1978) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6505, 6510. The
House version of § 303(h)(1) focused on the "inability" of the debtor to meet its obligations
as they come due. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 5963, 6280. The original Senate version, on the other
hand, contemplated either the debtor's inability or the debtor's actual failure to "pay a major
portion of his debts as they become due." S. RP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 5787, 5820. The final version of §
303(h)(1), therefore, embodied a much more liberal standard than anything which had been
conceived under the Act. See In re Hill, 5 Bankr. 79, 82-83 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (ability
to pay is not a direct factor in determining whether or not a debtor is "generally not paying"
its debts for purposes of adjudicating an involuntary petition), aff'd, 8 Bankr. 779 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1981). See generally infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the standards which the courts have used for determining when a debtor is generally not
paying its current debts.
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the speed with which such relief might be gained. Also, since equity
insolvency may exist while the debtor is still fully solvent in a balance sheet
sense, 44 under the Reform Act creditors no longer would have to anxiously
endure the squandering or secreting away of a debtor's assets, or helplessly
watch one creditor secure an unfair advantage over others, while awaiting
satisfaction of the Act's formalities regulating access to bankruptcy protec-
tion.4
Under the Reform Act, neither sections 303(b) nor 303(h)(1) spoke directly
to the manner in which disputed debts were to be handled in ascertaining
a petitioning creditor's standing and whether or not the debtor was generally
paying its debts as they came due. Moreover, the legislative history provided
no guidance: However, Code definitions lent support for the proposition
that even a claim disputed by the debtor in good faith was sufficient to
vest its holder with authority to file for involuntary relief and that, if
matured, the same disputed claim could be counted among the debtor's
unpaid debts for purposes of determining whether the debtor was insolvent.
Specifically, the Code's definition of a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes
unequivocally included both disputed and contingent obligations. 46 Like its
Bankruptcy Act predecessor, section 303(b) then excluded any creditor whose
claim against the debtor was "contingent as to liability" from joining in
an involuntary proceeding.47 However, the statute contained no comparable
limitation on the rights of creditors holding disputed claims. While section
303(h)(1) was worded in terms of the payment of "debts" rather than
claims, the Code defined the term "debt" as "liability on a claim," '4 thus
arguably backing into the same broad definition. 49
The foregoing construction of the Code as originally enacted seemed to
support a rule of presumptive inclusion of disputed debts under section 303.
This result was not only justifiable under the actual wording of the Code
44. Ordinarily, such a condition would be attributable to either the debtor's illiquidity due
to poor cash flow management or malfeasance in the timely payment of current obligations.
45. This ability to obtain a prompt determination on an involuntary petition was precisely
the goal which the Bankruptcy Commission identified as central to any reform of involuntary
bankruptcy law and procedure. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 38, at 186-
87. The Code's adoption of the non-payment of debts as the ultimate controlling fact in
determining whether a debtor should be adjudged a bankrupt also served to vindicate Professor
MacLachlan, who had lobbied vigorously for just such a change in the law in order to
maximize and more equitably apportion value for creditor interests. J. MACLACHLAN, supra
note 34, at 58, 63-64.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982), discussed at supra note 40.
47. The exclusion in § 303(b) for contingent claims offered further support for the view
that a creditor's standing was not invalidated by a legitimate dispute inasmuch as § 101(4)
identified both contingent and disputed obligations as falling within the broad ambit of a
"claim" for Code purposes.
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982).
49. See infra note 177 for discussion of conflicting views on whether or not the meaning
for Bankruptcy Code purposes of the terms "claim" and "debt" are coextensive.
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provisions, but was also consistent with the drafters' overall goal of liber-
alizing the rules governing involuntary petitions. Such an expansive inter-
pretation might have been criticized for creating an unreasonable risk that
involuntary bankruptcy would be used to coerce payments of specious claims
or debts disputed in good faith. However, proponents of a broad rule of
inclusion might have forcefully responded that the sanctions in section 303(i)
for filings undertaken in bad faith provided a more direct, measured, and
effective deterrent to such abusive practices than the imposition of limita-
tions on the rights of disputed claimholders.50 Nevertheless, between 1979
and 1984, the courts, while certainly not in agreement over what to do with
disputed debts under section 303, never truly adopted a posture of total
indifference toward debts subject to an honest squabble.5 ' Moreover, during
this period the courts adopted very different approaches to the question of
how to treat disputed debts depending on whether the issue was a claim-
holder's qualifications to maintain suit or instead was the existence of a
sufficient basis for relief in that suit once it had been properly initiated.
III. THE PRE-1984 ACT CASE LAW
A. Disputed Debts Under Section 303(b)
The predominant approach taken by the courts in dealing with disputed
debts under the new Bankruptcy Code's eligibility standards for seeking
involuntary relief was enunciated and crisply illustrated in In re All Media
Properties, Inc.12 In that case, which actually involved separate petitions
against two affiliated companies, 53 the debtors had sought to disqualify the
holders of certain unmatured and contested claims on the grounds that such
claims failed to satisfy the statutory requirement that a petitioner's claim
be "not contingent as to liability." The court used the occasion to reflect
50. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) had no direct counterpart under the
Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, there is no doubt but that its adoption under the Code was in
fact intended to serve as a counterweight to the Code's more liberal provisions regarding access
to involuntary relief. See BANKRUPTCY COMIMnSSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 190 (discussing
the court's discretion to award fees and damages as a means of protecting against creditor
abuses without compromising creditors' right to equal treatment inter se through bankruptcy
relief); see also In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126, 135 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)
(wherein the court accepted precisely this argument concerning the relationship between §§
303(b) and 303(1)), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text).
51. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that a debt might be "disputed" for a
variety of different causes ranging from legal defenses, defenses on the merits and defenses as
to amount, on the one hand, to counterclaims, setoffs and claims for recoupment, on the
other.
52. 5 Bankr. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. The two cases were consolidated for hearing upon agreement of the parties because of
the similarity of the issues involved. Id. at 131.
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on the significance of the omission from section 303(b) of an exclusion for
the holders of unmatured, disputed or unliquidated claims.5 4 Contrasting
the more complex procedures and requirements under the Bankruptcy Act,
including the more restrictive language of section 59b, the court concluded
that section 303 manifested a clear legislative intent to simplify the issues
addressed upon the filing of an involuntary petition and, thereby, expand
creditors' access to bankruptcy relief. 5
Given these purposes, the All Media court held that a claim is not
contingent merely because it is uncertain as to amount, so long as liability
is absolutely fixed.5 6 By the same token, the court admonished that a legal
obligation is not rendered contingent because a dispute as to liability arises
after it is incurred. 7 The terms "contingent" and "disputed" are not
synonymous. Rather, the court resolved that the merits or demerits of the
debtor's alleged defenses to a creditor's claim are largely collateral to the
issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction over an involuntary petition.
Therefore, consideration of the validity of disputed but non-contingent
claims would be deferred until subsequently raised, if at all, by proper
proceedings in the ensuing bankruptcy administration.5 1
While at first blush the All Media decision appeared to embrace an
unqualified rule that counterclaims and defenses to a petitioning creditor's
claim are wholly irrelevant for purposes of section 303(b), a careful reading
of the case reveals that the court stopped short of slamming the door
completely shut. In concluding its analysis of the impact of a bona fide
dispute under section 303(b), the court stated:
If there is a bona fide dispute of either fact or law then the holder
would not be disqualified from being a petitioning creditor since he
would be the holder of a disputed claim, but not one that is contingent
54. The Code has gone much further in allowing holders of claims to bring involuntary
petitions; only holders of claims that are contingent as to liability are denied the right to be
petitioning creditors. It is significant that holders of unmatured, disputed and unliquidated
claims are not specifically barred from being petitioning creditors. Id. at 132.
55. Id. at 135 (less restrictive jurisdictional requirements for bringing an involuntary petition
are consistent with the pervasive jurisdiction given to the bankruptcy courts under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
56. Id. at 133. The court identified the liability of a guarantor on a promissory note as a
"classic case" of contingent liability-that being one in which the debtor would only be called
on to pay upon the happening of an extrinsic event. Also, although none of the claims at
issue arose in tort, the court suggested that a tort claim for negligence might rightly be
characterized as contingent unless and until reduced to judgment. Id. See infra note 73 for
additional discussion of the question of contingency in the context of tort claims.
57. Id. The court concluded that such a claim-i.e., one arising out of the sale of a
defective product-is disputed but not contingent since a legal obligation arose at the time of
sale.
58. Id. at 134. Essentially, the court interpreted § 303(b)(1) as pegging jurisdiction in an
involuntary case to filing by the requisite number of holders of claims, and not necessarily
holders of valid claims. Of course, should the petition be dismissed or withdrawn, the
bankruptcy court would be spared from ever having to resolve the dispute over the claim.
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as to liability within the definition fashioned above. On the other hand,
if the debtor can establish to a certainty that the debt is barred or that
the amount is other than alleged without substantial factual or legal
questions, then the alleged debt should not be considered and the holder
would not be qualified to be a petitioning creditor in the amount
claimed. 9
Thus, the All Media court left open the possibility that, under the right
circumstances, a meritorious defense could be used to invalidate a petitioning
creditor's claim provided that such defense could be established clearly and
without the need to resort to extensive proof. 60
Most of the other courts which considered the standing of a creditor
holding a non-contingent but disputed claim acceded in the liberal interpre-
tation given to section 303(b) by the All Media court. 6' For example, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the existence of defenses which, if estab-
lished, would eliminate liability on the debt, did not impair the holder's
standing to petition for involuntary bankruptcy. 62 Nevertheless, a few courts
expressed reservations over this broad construction of qualified claims under
section 303(b). 63 Moreover, the process of drawing the line between a
59. Id. at 135-36.
60. The court justified drawing this distinction between complex and non-complex defenses
on the basis of both the debtor's and creditors' interest in a prompt resolution of an involuntary
petition. Id. at 134.
61. For examples of cases holding that the assertion of a counterclaim or defense to a
claim does not render the claim "contingent as to liability," see In re Dill, 30 Bankr. 546,
549 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (a claim is only contingent if liability is dependent on some future
event that may never happen), aff'd, Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984);
In re First Energy Leasing Corp., 38 Bankr. 577, 582 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (under prevailing
authority, holders of disputed claims are eligible to be involuntary petitioners); In re Tampa
Chain Co., 35 Bankr. 568, 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (resolution of disputes should be left
for a later time); In re R.N. Salem Corp., 29 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (the
right to be a petitioning creditor does not depend on the existence of an undisputed claim);
In re McMeekin, 16 Bankr. 805, 807 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (a creditor is not disqualified
from joining in an involuntary petition because its claim is disputed); In re Gill Enterprises,
15 Bankr. 328, 331 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (creditors with accrued but disputed claims are
qualified to file an involuntary petition); McNeil v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. (In re
McNeil), 13 Bankr. 434, 436 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (the fact that the debtor disputes a
petitioner's claim and has asserted a counterclaim against it does not make the claim contingent);
In re Duty Free Shops Corp., 6 Bankr. 38, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (the debtor's refusal
to concede a claim's validity does not invalidate its holder from seeking involuntary relief);
see also Taube, Involuntary Bankruptcy: Who May Be a Petitioning Creditor?, 21 Hous. L.
Rav. 339 (1984).
62. In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 1981). As was true in other cases as well,
the court cited All Media for the proposition that disputed claimholders were unqualifiedly
eligible to be involuntary petitioners.
63. Most notably, Judge Friendly, albeit in dictum, indicated his reluctance to accept the
conclusion that "Congress intended . . . that a claim qualifies under § 303(b), when the claim
is subject to serious dispute." B.D. Int'l Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re
B.D. Int'l Discount Corp.), 701 F.2d 1071, 1076 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830
(1983).
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contingent claim and a disputed one was not always accomplished with
great ease or consistency."
Standing in probably the greatest contradistinction to All Media was the
bankruptcy court's opinion in In re Kreidler Import Corp.6 In that case,
the debtor objected to the standing of a creditor that had joined in the
involuntary petition on the basis of an alleged counterclaim against such
creditor which, if proven, would have completely setoff the amount of the
creditor's claim." Based on its examination of the record, the court con-
cluded that the debtor's counterclaim had at least a bona fide factual basis
and, accordingly, extinguished the creditor's claim as forming the basis for
joinder in the involuntary petition.67 Notably, the court in Kreidler also
invalidated the claim of another petitioning creditor whom the court deter-
mined had received, and failed to surrender before the petition was filed,
a voidable preference under section 547(b) of the Code.6
64. See infra note 73 for citation of authorities using contingent analysis to bar certain
claimholders from eligibility to seek bankruptcy relief; see also First Energy Leasing, 38 Bankr.
at 582 (court observed the temptation to solve the dilemma over disputed debts by defining
"contingent" in such a manner as to subsume "disputed" and "unmatured," but declined to
do so absent more explicit legislative direction).
65. 4 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980).
66. Id. at 259. The essence of the counterclaim was for damages attributable to the alleged
breach of a certain distribution agreement between the creditor (Slemons Leasing & Auto
Rental) and the debtor. Coincidentally, the basis of Slemon's claim against the debtor was
amounts due from the debtor under the same agreement. Id. Thus, while the facts are not
entirely clear, the substance of the counterclaims might also have been characterized as offering
a specific defense to liability on the creditor's claim. However, the court seemed to attach no
relevance to the connection between the subject matter of the correlative claim and counterclaim.
Id. This omission is significant since, as against another creditor (M.L. Alverson), the court
brushed aside the debtor's counterclaim under a different distribution agreement on the basis
that "disputed claims are nonetheless claims." Id. at 258.
67. Id. at 259.
68. Id. at 258-59. The court in Kreidler failed to satisfactorily explain why receipt of a
preference should disqualify a creditor from validly intervening in an involuntary petition,
citing only to a policy to that effect purportedly developed under the Act. Id. at 259. The
conclusion is particularly suspect under the Code since, while § 303(b)(2) expressly excludes a
claimant having received a preference from the calculation of whether the debtor's creditors
number twelve or more, there is no indication in the language of § 303(b) or elsewhere that
such a creditor, if it so chooses, is barred from validly joining in an involuntary petition.
In fact, it remains unclear whether receipt of a voidable transfer, or the debtor's promise
to make a preferential transfer, should be treated as either tainting that creditor's standing
under § 303(b) or eliminating such claim for purposes of the analysis under § 303(h)(1).
Although that inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, a persuasive case can be made for
a negative response on both counts inasmuch as the net effect of a successful avoidance action
is to place the preferred creditor in the same position as any other unsecured claimholder as
of the time of filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (Supp. IV 1986).
Also of note in Kreidler is the fact that the offending payment was made after the petition
was filed and was thus only avoidable, if at all, under § 549 and not, as the court indicated,
under § 547(b). Finally, since the "generally not paying" test under § 303(h)(1) must be applied
as to the date of filing, the subsequent payment would be of no significance relative to whether
or not grounds for involuntary relief existed. See In re Molen Drilling Co., 68 Bankr. 840,
846 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
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While Kreidler, at first, might have been seen as establishing a major
exception to the All Media approach to disputed debts when the debtor
asserted a counterclaim of equal or greater magnitude against a creditor,
such a perception would have been wrong. First of all, Kreidler was decided
before All Media, and the Kreidler court expressly relied on pre-Code law
in support of its conclusions. 69 In addition, subsequent courts harmonized
the two decisions by pointing out that in Kreidler the parties had stipulated
to the facts comprising the counterclaim." Therefore, the debtor's counter-
claim in Kreidler arguably presented precisely the sort of "open-and-shut"
defense which the All Media court recognized might in fact serve to prevent
a claimholder from validly joining in an involuntary petition. Later courts
considering contested counterclaims thus perceived little difficulty in apply-
ing the All Media rationale of functionally separating the issues presented
by the counterclaim from the issues presented by the petition.7'
Therefore, prior to 1984, a debtor that sought to protest the validity of
an involuntary petition on jurisdictional grounds by contesting a petitioning
creditor's eligibility to file was relegated to attempting to define what might
be in essence a disputed claim as being contingent as to liability. Of course,
All Media had already formulated a fairly narrow construction of what
constituted a contingent claim, 72 so the task was a considerable one. How-
ever, it was not hopeless, and, on occasion, a bona fide defense or
counterclaim to a petitioning creditor's debt might sneak back into the
section 303(b) analysis under this guise. 73 Nonetheless, prior to the 1984
69. Kriedler, 4 Bankr. at 259 (citing Harris v. Capehart-Farnsworth Corp., 225 F.2d 268,
270 (8th Cir. 1955)).
70. See, e.g., Tampa Chain, 35 Bankr. at 577 n.8; In re North County Chrysler Plymouth,
13 Bankr. 393, 398 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
71. For example, in In re Hill, 5 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980), aff'd, 8 Bankr. 779
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1981), the debtor challenged the standing of the petitioning creditor (to
whom an indebtedness was indisputably owed) on the basis of alleged antitrust and other
counterclaims still pending in state court at the time the petition was filed. In rejecting this
challenge to the creditor's qualifications, the court stated: "The mere fact of the pendency of
the undecided litigation with respect to defenses and claims is not directly relevant to the issues
presented by the petition." Id. at 82.
72. All Media, 5 Bankr. at 133; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
73. While paying lip service to the narrow construction of contingent claims advanced by
the court in All Media, several courts used contingent analysis, and the dictum in All Media
regarding negligent torts, id. at 133 (see supra note 56), to find that various intentional torts
and corporate veil-piercing claims were contingent as to liability as well as to amount unless
and until reduced to final judgment. See, e.g., In re Elsub Corp., 70 Bankr. 797, 808 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1987) (claims for discriminatory conduct and wrongful discharge invalidated as contin-
gent); In re Turner, 32 Bankr. 244, 248-49 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (alter ego and fraud claims
are contingent pending a judicial finding of liability).
On the other hand, some courts gave the construction of non-contingent claims for purposes
of § 303(b) an even more restrictive interpretation than that proposed in All Media. See, e.g.,
Dill, 30 Bankr. at 549 ("A tort claim ordinarily is not contingent as to liability; the events
that give rise to the tort claim usually have occurred and liability is not dependent on some
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Act, courts by and large resisted the temptation to complicate the litigation
in involuntary cases by grafting detailed creditor qualification requirements
on to the simple, direct language of section 303(b).7 4
B. Disputed Debts Under Section 303(h)(1)
As noted earlier, if the debtor controverts an involuntary petition, the
Code requires the petitioners to establish the existence of proper grounds
for entry of an order of relief.7 Under section 303(h)(1), relief is warranted
if the petitioning creditors can show that, at the time of filing,7 6 the debtor
was insolvent in the "equity sense" of not satisfying current obligations as
they became due.
Unlike a balance sheet analysis, ascertaining what constitutes a general
failure to pay matured debts involves considering a myriad of factors relating
to the debtor's overall financial condition and debt structure. These factors
include analyses of liquidity and cash flow, the debtor's actual payment
record and practices, and the materiality of the debtor's delinquencies in
relation to the magnitude of the debtor's operations. 77 In other words,
"equity sense" insolvency cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula.78
Rather, the courts generally agree that the determination must be based on
the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. 79 However, before Con-
future event that may never happen."); In re Bowers, 16 Bankr. 298, 301 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981) (the debtor's guarantee obligation was held to be non-contingent even though the primary
obligor had not actually defaulted in circumstances where the condition to liability appeared
virtually certain to occur).
74. See, e.g., In re Longhorn 1979-II Drilling Program, 32 Bankr. 923, 927 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1983). In Longhorn, the court stated:
Thus, a tort claim accrues at the moment the course of events is first sufficiently
ripe for suit. Lack of judgment does not affect the tort claim so as to make it
contingent, but the judgment concerns only enforceability and payment of the
claim. The contingency is whether the creditor will obtain a judgment, not
whether he has a claim sufficient for an involuntary petition.
Id.; see also Tampa Chain, 35 Bankr. at 577 n.7 (disputes do not make claims contingent).
75. See supra notes 5-8.
76. See, e.g., In re Molen Drilling Co., 68 Bankr. 840, 846 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (the
"generally not paying" test is applied as of the time of filing).
77. See In re Caucus Distribs., 83 Bankr. 921, 931 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (reviewing the
various standards articulated by the courts for determining when a debtor is generally not
paying its debts).
78. See, e.g., Hayes v. Rewald (In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc.),
779 F.2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1985) (the determination of what constitutes "generally not paying"
is not reducible to a simplistic formula); In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 Bankr. 405, 407 (Bankr.
N.D. II1. 1989) (the test of "generally not paying" is not intended to be mechanically applied).
79. Compare In re Dakota Lay'd Eggs, 57 Bankr. 648 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (setting forth
the five-part test for determining "generally not paying" first articulated in In re Gill Enters.,
15 Bankr. 328, 332 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981)) with Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81 Bankr.
738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (recommending that the issue be resolved by use of a two-step
inquiry). See also In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 Bankr. 405, 408-09 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)
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gress specifically addressed the issue in 1984, it was unclear whether disputed
debts and obligations were to be included in the examination of the debtor's
practices regarding payment of matured debts. Moreover, the question of
what to do with disputed debts in this context was more problematic than
the parallel question of how to treat disputed debts for jurisdictional
purposes under section 303(b). Unlike section 303(b), section 303(h)(1) had
no specific counterpart under the Bankruptcy Act from which legislative
intent might be inferred. 80
In All Media, after establishing that the existence of a good faith dispute
did not defeat the court's jurisdiction under section 303(b), the court
considered the effect of extending its reasoning to the issue of the petitioners'
entitlement to relief. Noting the undesirability of debtors paying disputed
debts solely to avoid being forced into bankruptcy, the court wasted little
time in concluding that "where a debtor falls to pay a debt which is subject
to a bona fide dispute that debt should not be considered a debt which has
not been paid as it became due."' 8' Therefore, in the judgment of the All
Media court, a petitioning creditor's debt might be counted for one purpose
under section 303 (standing), but not for another (entitlement to relief); a
perhaps subtle, but hardly revolutionary, concept that different standards
may be applied to interpret a phrase when the consequences of the outcome
differ.82 Of course, it may not always be the same debts which are considered
(creditor who had allowed late payments as a matter of course could not rely on such late
payments to show the debtor was not paying its debts when due); In re Laclede Cab Co., 76
Bankr. 687, 691-92 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987) (established course of conduct and past practices
are relevant to question of whether debtor's payments were timely); In re Arriola Energy
Corp., 74 Bankr. 784, 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) ("No one factor is necessarily determinative
of whether, in fact, the Debtor is generally not paying debts as they become due."); In re
CLE Corp., 59 Bankr. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (examination of debtor's entire financial
situation and debt structure may be necessary in making the determination).
80. See supra note 33 for citation of those provisions of the Bankruptcy Act where specific
legal consequences were made to turn on the debtor's inability (as contrasted with the Code's
focus on the debtor's failure) to pay debts as they matured. Where the test is phrased in terms
of "inability to pay," a good faith dispute is arguably irrelevant. By contrast, when actual
failure rather than inability is the standard, refusal to pay, even on the basis of allegedly
legitimate defenses, has a direct bearing on whether or not the standard is satisfied. For
discussion of the legislative history behind the drafting of § 303(h)(1), see supra note 43.
81. All Media, 5 Bankr. at 144; accord In re First Energy Leasing, 38 Bankr. at 584.
82. This idea of developing separate definitions in separate contexts under a statute based
upon assumptions of what Congress intended in each case is consistent with the approach
which some scholars have identified as the "narrow issue thinking" of the legal realist
movement. For the proposition that separate definitions of the same term may develop under
two different codes, see, for example, Lloyd, Refinancing Purchase Money Security Interests,
53 TENN. L. REv. 1, 79 n.369 (1985) (citing Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HAgv. L. Rv. 1222, 1237 (1931)), and G. GrIMoRE, THE
ACEs OF AmERicAN LAw 82-83 (1977); see also Knippenberg, Tacit Exclusion: Defining Code
Terms Using Extraneous References, 39 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1261 (1988).
An example of this concept,"applied on an intra-code basis, can be found in the Bankruptcy
Code's approach to the issue of valuation. Section 506 explicitly recognizes that the valuation
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under the two analyses. A debtor may challenge entitlement to relief under
section 303(h)(1) by contesting the validity of the claims of non-petitioning
as well as petitioning creditors. By contrast, under section 303(b) only the
claims of petitioning creditors are at issue."3
In In re Covey, s4 the Seventh Circuit, while following All Media insofar
as the section 303(b) analysis was concerned,"5 took a rather different
approach to the disputed debts issue under section 303(h)(1). In large
measure, the court saw its approach as controlled by the policies behind
the Reform Act. The court emphasized that an important goal of the new
Bankruptcy Code was the protection of creditors' interest through a prompt
determination of the involuntary petition.8 6 This necessarily implicated an
interest in prompt resolution of the question of whether the debtor was
generally not paying its current debts. Thus, while sympathizing with the
All Media court's concern over undue coercion of the debtor, the Covey
court felt that wholesale exclusion of disputed debts undermined an impor-
tant goal of the new Bankruptcy Code-preserving creditors' rights to the
debtor's property. 7 On the other hand, the strength of the competing policy
interests dissuaded the court from adopting a per se rule of inclusion of
disputed debts in the "generally not paying" analysis."8
of property subject to a lien does not take place in a vacuum. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
Rather, it makes a difference when and why the property is being valued. Thus, the legislative
history of § 506(a) states that "a valuation early in the case in a proceeding under sections
361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or creditor at the time of confirmation of the
plan." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Amnmi. NEws 5787, 5854; see also H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnmN. NEws 5963, 6312 ("Courts will have to determine value on
a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in
the case."); In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 77 Bankr. 991, 1005 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987)
("MVialuation of collateral is temporal, and must take into consideration both the reason the
valuation is being made and the contemplated disposition or use of the collateral.") (citing 3
CoLLrER ON BANKRupTcY 506.04 (15th ed. 1989)).
83. In circumstances where the debtor contested the validity of the petitioning creditors'
claims, the existence of a bona fide dispute which was insufficient to exclude a petitioning
creditor's claim under § 303(b) might nevertheless have been excluded from the category of
unpaid debts in ascertaining whether or not an order for relief would enter. In All Media, for
example, the court excluded twelve obligations from among respondent-debtor Artlite Broad-
casting Co.'s unpaid accounts for purposes of determining whether Artlite was generally not
paying its debts on the basis that such accounts were disputed. All Media, 5 Bankr. at 144-
46. Although the court did not specifically say so, presumably certain of the petitioning
creditors' claims were among those disputed obligations.
84. 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1981).
85. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
86. 650 F.2d at 882-83 ("Creditors are entitled to a prompt resolution of the 'generally
paying debts' question in order to prevent wasting of assets and in order to ensure that they
receive all of their rights to the debtor's property afforded by the Code."(citations omitted)).
87. Id. at 883.
88. Specifically, the court stated: "The Coveys seem to ask for a universal rule excluding
disputed debts from the calculation of 'generally paying debts.' But the policy considerations
regarding such a rule do not unanimously support either exclusion or inclusion of disputed
debts from the 'generally paying debts' calculation." Id. at 882.
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To resolve the dilemma, the court in Covey formulated a set of detailed
guidelines for the bankruptcy courts to apply on a case-by-case basis.8 9 If
the dispute concerned only the amount of the obligation, the bankruptcy
court would be required, without further inquiry, to take the debt into
account when evaluating whether the debtor was generally paying its current
obligations. 90 However, if the debtor's dispute went to the existence or the
validity of the claim, the court would need to go to the next step and
consider the complexity of the litigation required to resolve the dispute.
Should substantial litigation be needed to assess the merits of the dispute,
the debt would simply be counted under section 303(h)(1). 91 On the other
hand, if the substance of the dispute could be adjudicated without extensive
or complex litigation, the bankruptcy court would be obliged to weigh the
creditors' interest in a prompt determination of the involuntary petition
against the debtor's interest in avoiding bankruptcy, and then only reach
the merits of the dispute when the debtor's interest predominated. 92 In that
event, inclusion or exclusion for purposes of section 303(h)(1) would be
based on the court's actual assessment of the validity of the debtor's
defenses. However, should the balance tip in the creditor's favor, the debt
would, once again, automatically be considered unpaid for purposes of the
"generally not paying" analysis, with the understanding that the court
would defer determining the merits of the specific dispute until after entry
of an order for relief.93
On reflection, the standard prescribed in Covey for dealing with disputed
debts under section 303(h)(1) bears a remarkable resemblance to the All
Media test for establishing when holders of disputed claims could be counted
for jurisdictional purposes under section 303(b). In each situation, the
debtor's assertion of counterclaims or defenses would be eliminated as an
issue in the court's disposition of the petition, except in certain exceptional
and narrowly defined cases. Therefore, in most cases the debtor's disputes
89. Interestingly, the court suggested that its approach actually derived from the analysis
in All Media. Id. at 883 n.8.
90. Id. at 883.
91. Id. This would also be true in cases where the "substantial litigation" question would
itself require substantial litigation.
92. Id. The court also suggested that when "the scales seem equally balanced," the disputed
debt should be considered unpaid and, therefore, be included against the debtor, since the
Code clearly emphasizes the prompt resolution of involuntary bankruptcy cases. Id.
93. Id. at 883-84 (citing generally All Media, 5 Bankr. at 134-36). In sum, Covey determined
that disputed debts would be excluded from the "generally not paying" calculation only when
all of the following conditions are met:
I) the dispute is whether any claim exists, not merely regarding the amount of
a claim; 2) the dispute can be examined without substantial litigation of legal or
factual questions; and 3) the interests of the debtor in defeating an order of
involuntary bankruptcy outweigh creditors' interests in achieving a somewhat
more rapid determination of the involuntary bankruptcy question.
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would be resolved, if at all, in the regular course of the debtor's ensuing
bankruptcy administration.
Other courts, including panels of the Second and Ninth Circuits, were
more equivocal than Covey in their willingness to consider disputed debts
when making judgments about the debtor's payment practices under section
303(h)(1). 94 In In re R.N. Salem Corp.,9 the district court openly criticized
the Covey standard as too harsh. The court recommended that the circum-
stances which the Covey court viewed as conditions dictating inclusion of
disputed debts should only be considered factors in a balancing process.96
In other words, in all cases, "the essential question requires the Court to
weigh the creditors' interest against those of the debtor. ' 97
The 1984 Act forestalled a judicial resolution of the disagreement between
Covey and All Media concerning the impact of legitimately disputed debts
under section 303(h)(1). Yet, in most of the cases decided up to that time
courts recognized the wisdom of dealing with the disputed debts issue
differently depending on whether it arose in the context of the court's
jurisdiction to consider a petition for involuntary relief or in connection
with the petitioner's entitlement on the merits to such relief. Consequently,
by the time Congress was considering the 1984 amendments to the Code,
the courts had not only already taken cognizance of the problem of disputed
claims and debts under section 303, but had actually developed several
methods of analysis to take account of such debts. Although certainly no
consensus had developed as to which methodology was best, in virtually all
instances the courts had designed approaches with an appreciation for the
fact that it mattered why the question was being asked.
IV. TH:E 1984 AMENDMENTS
In 1984 Congress attempted to end the judicial disagreement over the
treatment of disputed debts in involuntary proceedings. Section 426(b) of
the 1984 Act amended section 303 of the Code by: 1) disqualifying under
94. In B.D. Intl Discount, 701 F.2d at 1077, Judge Friendly, while deciding the case
consistent with the Covey guidelines, nevertheless deferred general adoption of these guidelines
as written or in modified form pending consideration of additional cases.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit was even more hostile to Covey, suggesting it went too far
in favoring creditors' interests, but sharing Judge Friendly's opinion that it was "a bit early
in the day" to formulate such detailed guidelines. Dill, 731 F.2d at 632. Having declined to
lay down a definitive rule, the court in Dill held that the bankruptcy courts should resolve
the question of inclusion or exclusion of designated debts under § 303(h)(1) by a more simple,
even-handed balancing of the creditors' interests against those of the debtor. Id.
95. 29 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id. In this respect, the court's approach was essentially the same as the rule eventually
enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Dill. See supra note 94. In fact, the court in Dill cited
Salem as an example of thoughtful, developing case law in the area. Dill, 731 F.2d at 632.
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subsection (b) any entity holding a claim subject to a bona fide dispute
from validly joining in an involuntary petition; and 2) purging from the
category of unpaid debts which might count against the debtor under
subsection (h)(1) debts subject to a bona fide dispute.98 Thus, in one fell
swoop, Congress seemed to eliminate the debate over the exclusion of
disputed debts under section 303 in favor of debtors' interests.
The legislative history of these amendments is sparse; making the precise
determination of congressional intent a difficult task. It is apparent, how-
ever, that Congress did not intend debtors to face the Hobson's choice of
either paying genuinely disputed obligations or suffering the stigma of a
bankruptcy filing. Senator Baucus, the proponent of the amendments,
offered the following explanation from the floor:
[M]y amendment is designed to correct what I perceive to be an
unintended inequity in the law of involuntary bankruptcies.
The problem can be explained simply. Some courts have interpreted
section 303's language on a debtor's general failure to pay debts as
allowing the filing of involuntary petitions and the granting of invol-
untary relief even when the debtor's reason for not paying is a legitimate
and good-faith dispute over his or her liability....
... Under my amendment, the original filing of an involuntary
petition could not be based on debts that are the subject of a good-
faith dispute between the debtor and his or her creditors. In the same
vein, the granting of an order of relief could not be premised solely on
the failure of a debtor to pay debts that were legitimately contested as
to liability or amount.
I believe this amendment, although a simply [sic] one, is necessary to
protect the rights of debtors and to prevent misuse of the bankruptcy
system as a tool of coercion. I also believe it corrects a judicial
misinterpretation of existing law and congressional intent as to the proper
basis for granting involuntary relief.9
These comments are enlightening in several respects. First, they reflect a
tacit rejection of the Bankruptcy Commission and the Reform Act's phi-
losophy that the prospects for assessment of punitive damages and attorneys'
fees under section 303(i) provided a sufficient deterrent against questionable
or improper filings.' °° Second, in spite of earlier criticism that the weaknesses
under the Bankruptcy Act's system for involuntary relief could be directly
98. Subsequent to the 1984 Act, § 303(b) read, in pertinent part, as follows: "An involuntary
case against a person is commenced by the filing ... of a petition ... (1) by three or more
entities, each of which is ... a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent
as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute .... " Section 303(h)(1) established the
following as a criterion for relief: "[T]he court shall order relief against the debtor ... only
if-l) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless
such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute ......
99. 130 CONG. Rc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
100. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:315
INVOLUNTAR Y BANKRUPTCY
traced to an overly solicitous regard for the protection of debtors, the
remarks evince a revived concern about the potentially ruinous consequences
which the initiation of an involuntary proceeding can have on a debtor's
business. 10 Third, these comments insinuate a demonstrable pattern of
heavy-handed debt collection practices accomplished through manipulation
of the involuntary bankruptcy remedy. Finally, assuming Senator Baucus'
statement accurately reflected legislative sentiment, Congress apparently
believed that this amendment was also necessary to end the confusion over
disputed debts in the case law.
The validity of these postulates about involuntary bankruptcy may be
open to serious question. 0 2 However, in appraising the wisdom of the 1984
Act modifications to the statute, and in evaluating how effectively the
incorporation of this additional statutory language redressed the problems
that purportedly spawned its adoption, it is instructive to first consider how
the disputed debts issue has been approached by the courts subsequent to
the adoption of the 1984 Act.
V. THE POST-1984 CASE LAW
A. The Early Approaches
The first reported decision relating to the bona fide dispute issue decided
under the amended version of section 303 was In re Johnston Hawks,
Ltd.03 The case came before the court on the debtor's motion to dismiss
based upon the assertion of defenses to each of the petitioning creditors'
claims. The debtor argued that the defenses destroyed the creditors' standing
under newly-amended section 303(b). In order to rule on the motion, the
court initially faced the daunting task of deciding, under the scant legislative
history to the 1984 amendments, the appropriate standard for determining
whether the defenses rendered the petitioners' claims the subject of a bona
fide dispute. Noting the paucity of prior decisions discussing disputed debts
in relation to the issue of creditor standing,104 the bankruptcy judge in
101. Of course, that concern, which had accounted for the severe restrictions on involuntary
filings under the Act, was not totally ignored in the original drafting of the Code. See
BANKRUPTCY COM=MSSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 189 ("The net effect of the relevant
provisions of the present Act is that the business of a debtor grinds to a halt upon the filing
of an involuntary petition."). Therefore, to ameliorate the disruptive impact which an invol-
untary filing may have, even when the order for relief is subsequently denied, the 1978 Code
allowed for the debtor, in most instances, to continue to operate its business free of regulation
or restriction unless and until the order for relief was entered. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(f), 549(b)
(1982).
102. See infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
103. 49 Bankr. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985).
104. Id. at 830 ("Because holders of disputed claims were clearly permitted to be petitioning
creditors under the Code, cases generally have not discussed disputed claims within the context
of the standing of petitioning creditors."); see also discussion at supra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
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Johnston Hawks took an interesting approach. The court looked to and
then essentially borrowed the analysis from the pre-1984 case law dealing
with the question of inclusion of disputed debts under the section 303(h)(1)
"generally not paying" computation. °O In so doing, the court made a
significant unarticulated assumption about the nature of involuntary bank-
ruptcy law after the 1984 amendments-an assumption which, unfortu-
nately, '06also turned out to be prophetic. The Johnston Hawks court assumed
that the standard for analyzing the bona fides of a disputed claim or debt
was the same regardless of whether the issue was being decided to determine
standing under section 303(b), or to evaluate the merits of the petition
under section 303(h)(1).
Having decided to give credit to the balancing approaches which marked
the earlier case law under section 303(h)(1), the court fashioned a test for
analyzing the legitimacy of the petitioning creditors' claims under the new
"bona fide dispute" language in section 303(b). The test required consid-
eration of the following four factors:
1) the nature of the dispute;
2) the nature and the extent of the evidence supporting both the credi-
tor's claim and the debtor's defenses;
3) whether thie claim and corresponding defenses are asserted in good
faith and without fraud and deceit; and
4) whether, on balance, the interests of the creditor outweigh those of
the debtor.1°
Applying these newly-fashioned guidelines to the facts of the case before
it, the court found that the claim of one of the petitioning creditors was,
in fact, subject to a bona fide dispute. Therefore, the court held that the
petition was defective for want of a requisite number of qualified petitioning
creditors.108 However, rather than immediately dismissing the petition, the
court stayed its order for two weeks to allow the remaining two creditors
105. Id. at 830. The pre-1984 analysis of the disputed debts issue in the context of the
"generally not paying" test under § 303(h)(1) is discussed at supra text accompanying notes
75-98.
106. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text for discussion of the reasons why a
uniform standard for defining a bona fide dispute under amended § 303 may not be justified.
107. Johnston Hawks, 49 Bankr. at 831. Note that the fourth factor is nearly identical to
the test adopted in Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 1984), for measuring
when disputed debts should be included in the determination of whether or not the debtor
was generally paying its debts as they became due. See supra note 94.
108. Johnston Hawks, 49 Bankr. at 832-34. The nature of the dispute between the debtor
and the defeated creditor, Chicago Credit, related to whether the conditions to liability under
a promissory note from the debtor to Chicago Credit's assignor, which note formed the basis
of Chicago Credit's claim, had occurred. The court expressed reservation as to whether or not
either party was acting in good faith, but found that, on balance, the debtor's interests in
avoiding the negative consequences of an involuntary bankruptcy outweighed the counter
interests of Chicago Credit. Id. at 832.
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time to obtain the joinder of an additional creditor needed to satisfy the
requirements of section 303(b).109
The next case to discuss the bona fide dispute issue, In re Stroop,"0 took
a very different approach than the one advanced in Johnston Hawks. This
case also involved a challenge to the petitioner's standing to seek relief
under section 303(b). However, here the court concluded that the appropriate
standard for determining if a claim is subject to a bona fide dispute should
be the same legal test applied to summary judgment motions in conventional
civil cases."' Under this analysis, if the debtor's defense raises material
issues of fact or law sufficient to bar entry of summary judgment on the
creditor's claim, then the claim will be considered subject to a bona fide
dispute." 2 Given the extraordinary nature of summary relief, this standard
represented a dramatic departure from the pre-amendment practice of
defeating a petitioning creditor's standing only upon a showing of clear and
indisputable invalidity of its claim."' Not surprisingly, the creditor in Stroop
was unable to meet this demanding standard and the petition was dis-
missed." 4
Many of the cases decided since Johnston Hawks and Stroop have
employed one test or the other," 5 or adopted an approach which amounts
to a variation on the themes articulated in those two earlier decisions." 6
109. This procedure is specifically authorized by the Code. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 303(c)
(1982); FED. R. BAmmc. P. 1003(b) (as applied in In re Braten, 74 Bankr. 1021 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
110. 51 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
111. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
112. Stroop, 51 Bankr. at 212.
113. For the most part, in construing the pre-1984 version of § 303(b), the courts had
generally accepted the proposition that the existence of the debtor's defenses were collateral
to the issues raised by the petition. See, e.g., In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126,
134 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. In response to the petitioning creditor's claim, which was based upon liability under a
guarantee agreement, the debtor asserted reliance on alleged representations by the creditor
which, if proven, might form the basis for an estoppel defense. Stroop, 51 Bankr. at 212.
115. See, e.g., In re BDW Assocs., 75 Bankr. 909, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (employing
both the "balancing test" of Johnston Hawks and the "summary judgment" test of Stroop
in concluding that the petitioning creditors' claims were not subject to a bona fide dispute
and that such creditors were entitled to relief based upon the debtor's failure to pay current
debts), aff'd, B.D.W. Assocs. v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, 865 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1989); In
re Cates, 62 Bankr. 179 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (adopting the Stroop standard); see also In
re Caucus Distribs., 83 Bankr. 921, 928-29 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (court discussed, without
specifically adopting or rejecting any particular standard, all of the different approaches used
by the courts to define a bona fide dispute for purposes of § 303).
116. For example, in In re Hope Communications, Inc., 59 Bankr. 939 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1986), the court suggested that the "best approach" for identifying a bona fide dispute is one
which "is a combination of these two schemes combining an analysis of competing policy
interest in bankruptcy with a motion for summary judgment analysis .... " Id. at 943. By
contrast, in In re Sjostedt, 57 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986), Judge Paskay simply
reviewed the merits of the debtor's contrary contentions and made findings regarding whether
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However,_at least two bankruptcy courts expressed dissatisfaction with both
the Johnston Hawks and Stroop tests. Their alternate solutions to the
problem were very different.
B. The Lough and Busick Test
In In re Lough,1 7 the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan observed that the kind of judicial balancing of the creditors' and
debtor's interests proposed by Johnston Hawks as part of the bona fide
dispute analysis, was no longer permissible in light of the 1984 amendments
to section 303.' 8 Correspondingly, the Lough court criticized Stroop for
not considering situations where there is no genuine issue over material
facts but a genuine dispute over the legal standards applicable to those
facts." 9 To overcome this shortcoming, the court in Lough adopted a
modified Stroop summary judgment test. Under this test, a creditor is
disqualified when "there is either a genuine issue of material fact that bears
upon the debtor's liability or a meritorious contention as to the application
of law to undisputed facts.' 120 Thus, in a case involving undisputed facts,
the bankruptcy court would not be placed in the position of actually
resolving the state law issue of the debtor's liability to the creditor.
Lough, which like Stroop was a single petitioner case, dealt with the
bona fide dispute issue in the context of defenses to the petitioning creditor's
or not a bona fide dispute existed without specifically identifying any general rules or guidelines
by which such determinations were to be governed. Id. at 119-20. Finally, in Petralex Stainless,
Ltd. v. Bishop Tube Div. of Christiana Metals (In re Petralex), 78 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987), the court side-stepped the issue altogether, holding the new statutory exclusion for
disputed debts in § 303(b) was not so broad as to include debts which should be, but which
had not yet actually been, disputed. Id. at 744.
The standard articulated in In re Lough, 57 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), which
probably reflects the most widely adopted test for defining a bona fide dispute for § 303
purposes, was adapted from, and in substance is simply an extension of, the Stroop formulation.
See generally infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
117. 57 Bankr. at 993.
118. Id. at 995-97. The court also criticized Johnston Hawks to the extent it endorsed
inquiry into the subjective intentions of the parties since, in the court's judgment, to do so
would potentially disqualify a creditor in circumstances when the debtor asserted in good faith
a claim with little or no objective merit. Id. at 996-97.
119. Id. at 997.
120. Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to stress that the determination of the existence
of a bona fide dispute is itself sufficient to defeat the petitioning creditor's standing such that
the court "must not resolve any genuine issues of fact or law." Id. Thus, under Lough, it
would be even easier for the debtor to defend against a petition on jurisdictional grounds
since, as to questions of pure law, the bankruptcy court would not be permitted to determine
whether or not the debtor's defense was a meritorious one. Not surprisingly, on the facts of
the actual case, the petitioning creditor was not able to sustain the extraordinary showing
required by the court and the involuntary petition was dismissed. The fact that a claim may
be deemed subject to a bona fide dispute because of a meritorious contention as to the
application of law to undisputed facts does not, however, render the claim "contingent" under
§ 303(b). In re Nargassans, 103 Bankr. 446, 454 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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claim raised by the debtor for purposes of challenging the creditors' standing
under section 303(b). However, in In re Busick,I21 the District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana adopted Lough as setting forth the proper
legal standard for analyzing the issue of a "bona fide dispute" under both
sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1).'2 The court did not discuss or attempt to
justify its use of the same test for sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1). On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 23 indicating its agreement with the district
court "that the standard employed by the court in Lough is the formulation
most compatible with the congressional intent." 4 All other appellate courts
that have taken a position on the question of what constitutes a bona fide
dispute have elected to follow the Seventh Circuit's lead by also applying
the Lough/Busick summary judgment "plus" test in all cases.'2
C. The Drexler and Ross Test
The other line of cases rejecting both Johnston Hawks and Stroop
originated in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
with Judge Abram's opinion in In re Drexler.26 In that decision, the court
121. 65 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 637 ("Therefore, the court adopts the standard set forth in Lough: a bona fide
dispute as that term is used in §§ 303(b) and 303(h)[(1)] refers to a genuine issue of material
fact that bears upon the debtor's liability, or a meritorious contention as to the application
of law to undisputed facts.").
123. 831 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1987).
124. Id. at 749-50. In identifying the congressional intent, the court specifically relied on
the comments of Senator Baucus. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The court went
on to explain that, under this standard, "the bankruptcy court must determine whether there
is an objective basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the validity of debt." Id. at
750. Although the court purported to be endorsing the Lough standard, it might be argued
that this formulation represents an unwarranted expansion of the actual Lough test which, as
a foundational matter, accepted the Stroop notion that if the debtor's defenses were sufficient
to bar summary judgment on the creditor's claim, the claim should be treated as subject to a
bona fide dispute. See Lough, 57 Bankr. at 996. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court is granted very limited discretion to consider the objective merits of the'
disputed facts before having to deny summary judgment so that the actual evidence can be
weighed at trial. See generally 10A C. W Hr, A. MILLER & M. KANa, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND
PROCEDUruE § 2728 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
125. See B.D. W. Assocs., 865 F.2d at 65; Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d
1540 (10th Cir. 1988) (which, arguably, overrules Stroop, even in the district (Colorado) in
which it was decided). But see infra notes 193, 197 for discussion of whether the actual
application of the stated standard by these courts was, in fact, consistent with Lough. Other
courts adopting the Lough standard include: In re Leach, 92 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1988); In re General Trading, 87 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Ramm Indus., 83
Bankr. 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Garland Coal & Mining Co., 67 Bankr. 514 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1986). See Nargassans, 103 Bankr. at 449-50, in which the court, without expressly
adopting this standard, seemed to apply its reasoning in determining that certain of the
petitioners' claims were the subject of a bona fide dispute.
126. 56 Bankr. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). For a related decision involving an affiliated
debtor, see fn re Drexler Assocs., 57 Bankr. 312 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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spurned the Johnston Hawks balancing test as involving an unwarranted
inquiry into the debtor's subjective good faith in contradicting the petitioning
creditor's claim. 127 Judge Abram also rejected the Stroop summary judgment
test as ill-conceived at least in those situations when the dispute is the
subject of state court litigation which is already in the advanced stages by
the time the involuntary petition is filed. 128
However, after summarily dismissing the two existing formulations for
defining a bona fide dispute, the court demurred at attempting to devise
yet another all-embracing set of guidelines. Instead, Judge Abram elected
to decide the case on its particular facts and limit its precedential value
accordingly. 29 Specifically, the court cited a reluctance to set or attempt to
define the "outer boundaries" of the newly-included bona fide dispute
language of section 303, preferring instead to await the further refinement
which, Judge Abram concluded, would surely be supplied over time in the
form of subsequent adversary adjudications and scholarly commentary. 30
As to the two fact patterns actually presented in the case, Drexler did
offer certain generalized answers for the benefit of future litigants. First,
the court held that a creditor's claim based on an unstayed final judgment
could not be subject to a bona fide dispute for involuntary bankruptcy
purposes notwithstanding a pending appeal by the debtor' or even post-
127. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 966-67. Although decided before Lough, it is clear that the court
had the same basic criticisms of Johnston Hawks as did the Lough court. See supra note 118
and accompanying text. In addition, the court in Drexler found that the Johnston Hawks
standard was inappropriate in light of the advanced stage of the state court litigation at the
time the petition was filed, to which, the bankruptcy court believed, more deference should
be afforded. Specifically, the claims had already been reduced to final judgment, although an
appeal was pending as of the date the petition was filed. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 966-67.
128. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 966.
129. Id. at 967. Note that this approach is similar to the one adopted by the Second Circuit
prior to the 1984 amendments in deciding to await more cases before deciding whether to
accept, reject or modify the Covey test for analyzing dispute debts under § 303(h)(1). See B.D.
Int'l Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp.), 701 F.2d
1071, 1077 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
It may be significant, however, that in a later case Judge Abram cited Lough (which had
been decided in the interim), with seeming approval in dismissing an involuntary petition on
the basis of a "bona fide question" about the debtor's liability to the petitioners. See In re
Equidyne Properties, 60 Bankr. 245, 249 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also In re Tikijian, 76
Bankr. 304, 314-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), wherein Judge Abram also cited Lough as in
accord with her views concerning the inappropriateness, in some cases, of the Stroop and
Johnston Hawks tests; cf. infra notes 136, 138 and accompanying text for further consideration
of the relationship between the Lough standard and Drexler.
130. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 967.
131. Id. at 967-68; accord Caucus Distribs., 83 Bankr. at 928; In re Schiliro, 64 Bankr.
422, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); see also In re Albers, 71 Bankr. 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987) (debtor's contention that a creditor's judgment was fraudulently procured did not preclude
creditor from asserting the non-satisfaction of such judgment as a basis for involuntary relief).
The Drexler court did, however, allow that had the judgment been stayed pending appeal, the
creditor would likely be barred from joining in the involuntary petition. Drexler, 56 Bankr.
at 967 n.11; see also In re Raymark Indus., 99 Bankr. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
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filing developments on appeal favorable to the debtor.3 2 Second, the Drexler
court ruled that the debtor's assertion of counterclaims, "even if of sub-
stance, does not render the petitioner's claim the subject of a bona fide
dispute."' 33 However, the court noted that it was still necessary to consider
the substance of the counterclaims since, if clearly established, they might
operate to work a diminution or setoff of the petitioners' claims, "either
as part of the Code § 303(b)(1) analysis of the amount of the petitioner's
claim or as part of the Code § 303(h)(1) analysis of generally not paying,
in which the amount of a petitioner's claim may be relevant."'134 After
considering the facts before it, the court determined that the debtor's
counterclaims were without value. The court reached this result because the
issues raised by some of the counterclaims had already been finally adju-
dicated in the creditors' favor in state court, and the other counterclaims
could not be evaluated without unduly delaying a decision on the petition.'35
The Drexler court's treatment of unadjudicated counterclaims could be
seen as a rejection of the Lough approach. Under Lough, the mere existence
of potentially meritorious defenses are alone enough to bar the creditor's
claim. On the other hand, the Drexler departure from the Lough formulation
may be explained, or at least limited, by the court's distinction between
defenses and counterclaims,'36 a situation that was simply not presented in
Lough. Moreover, both courts agreed that the role of the bankruptcy courts
in passing on an involuntary petition is not actually to decide the underlying
merits of disputed claims. 37
132. Subsequent to the filing of the involuntary case, an appeal of one of the petitioners'
two pre-filing judgments was remanded by the Second Circuit on the basis that the district
court's certification of finality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) was improper.
However, Judge Abram observed that in determining matters respecting the petitioners' claims,
the bankruptcy court was obliged to consider the situation as it stood on the date the petition
was filed, provided that subsequent developments did not render a result manifestly unjust.
Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 968.
133. Id. at 969; accord In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 88 Bankr. 459, 462 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1988).
In holding that a debtor's counterclaims do not render the petitioner's claim subject to a
bona fide dispute, Judge Abram acknowledged her departure from the position espoused by
another bankruptcy court in In re Henry, 52 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). In that earlier
decision, the court had found the existence of such unresolved counterclaims sufficient tc
overcome the standing of two petitioning creditors holding final judgments against the debtor.
Henry, 52 Bankr. at 10 (while the question of liability on the creditors' claims was settled by
entry of final judgment, what unsettles the matter is the debtor's unadjudicated claim which
can effectively eliminate the debtor's technical liability). Cf. In re Kreidler Import Co., 4
Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980). For a discussion of Kreidler, see supra notes 65-69 and
accompanying text.
134. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 969-70.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 969 n.16 (court articulated such a distinction between defenses which go to
the heart of the petitioner's claim, and thus automatically create a bona fide dispute, and
counterclaims).
137. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Like most other post-1984 decisions, Drexler drew no distinction between
the definition of a "bona fide dispute" under sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1).13s
However, the Drexler court suggested that, prior to entering a final ruling
on the petition, it would be appropriate to balance the interests of the
creditors against those of the debtor to ensure that the "preliminary" result
reached by the court on the bona fide dispute question was compatible with
the "broader policy considerations evidenced in the sparse legislative history
to the [1984] amendment.' 1 39 In the instant case the debtor's business
enterprise had been in a "downward spiral" for well over a year, a fact
Judge Abram found weighed heavily in the petitioners' favor. Thus, the
court concluded that the equities supported the initial result it had reached
through its formal analysis under section 303(h)(1).140
Judge Abram had occasion to more fully develop her approach to defining
a bona fide dispute under section 303 in In Re Ross, 14 1 a case decided
within a year of Drexler. In Ross, the debtor asserted counterclaims and
defenses against the claims of several petitioning creditors for purposes of
contesting jurisdiction under section 303(b) and opposing the petitioners'
entitlement to relief under section 303(h)(1).142 Citing Drexler, Judge Abram
noted that her first responsibility in deciding whether the debtor's legal
position had merit was to review the posture of any pre-petition litigation
and give full effect to rulings made in that litigation as of the time the
involuntary case was filed. 43 Thus, the unstayed final judgment in favor of
one creditor precluded the debtor from asserting that a bona fide dispute
existed concerning that creditor's claims. 44 As to the non-final judgments
held by other creditors, the judge held that these also barred the debtor's
contention of a bona fide dispute. The judge supported this extension of
the Drexler holding by noting that these judgments were a "giant step"
towards the entry of final judgments. 45
Ross also involved a situation well beyond the parameters of the Drexler
holding. The claims of one petitioner were only in the most preliminary
138. Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 971.
139. Id. at 972.
140. Id.
141. 63 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
142. The factual background of the case was exceedingly complex, involving eight related
voluntary and involuntary cases and what the court referred to as a "sea of litigation" both
prior to and subsequent to the filing of the petition. Id. at 954. Ross, the debtor, was
apparently a promoter of several real estate limited partnerships of which he or a related entity
served as general partner. See generally Equidyne Properties, 60 Bankr. at 245.
143. Ross, 63 Bankr. at 960.
144. Id. at 969. Also, consistent with its position in Drexler, the court noted that the post-
filing vacation of such judgments on appeal on procedural grounds did not alter the analysis
since the relevant time for measuring the existence of a bona fide dispute is as of the date
and time the involuntary case is commenced. Id. at 972.
145. Id. at 967.
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stages of adjudication at the time the involuntary case was commenced.
Therefore, the pending state court proceeding offered no guidance to the
bankruptcy court in evaluating the legitimacy of the debtor's counterclaims
and defenses. In this situation, Judge Abram considered it proper to apply
the Stroop summary judgment test to these claims. 146 She concluded that
the debtor's defenses were factually and legally insufficient to withstand a
summary judgment motion by the creditor, and thus did not create a bona
fide dispute under section 303.147 With regard to the debtor's counterclaims,
Judge Abram reaffirmed her Drexler holding that counterclaims alone do
not create a bona fide dispute, and need not even be considered when
computing the amount owed by the debtor if to do so would unduly delay
disposition of the petition. 48
In addition to further defining the limitations of a bona fide dispute,
Ross is noteworthy for Judge Abram's admonition that, in considering the
standing of each petitioning creditor under section 303(b), "[u]ndue weight
cannot be placed on the nature of the claims held by the petitioners as the
debtor's true protection ... lies in the independent requirement of Code §
303(h) .... -149 Further, she noted that, ultimately, before ordering relief
in a contested involuntary case, "the court must test its result by balancing
the interests of the creditors against those of the debtor .... ."10 Later in
the decision, the judge also stated: "It is conceptually possible that the
claim of a person deemed an eligible petitioning creditor will ultimately be
disallowed since the inability to grant summary judgment in the petitioner's
favor is not necessarily fatal to the petitioner's standing."'' These obser-
vations were not central to the court's holdings in the case and, in fact,
were offered in a somewhat offhand way in the general discussion of
principles guiding the determination of each petitioning creditor's eligibility.
Nevertheless, they represent the first, and arguably the only, suggestions in
the post-1984 Bankruptcy Act case law that perhaps the test of a bona fide
dispute under section 303(b) might be different, or at least applied differ-
ently, than the standard used to address the same question for section
146. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
147. Ross, 63 Bankr. at 962-63. Judge Abram's application of the Stroop test in this context
should not be viewed as a wholesale endorsement. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
Also, in a later case from the same district, Nargassans, 103 Bankr. at 446, Judge Buschman
described the rule in the Second Circuit as "not so strict" as the standard imposed by the
Stroop summary judgment test. Id. at 449. However, in support of that proposition the judge
cited pre-1984 case law-B.D. Int'l Discount, 701 F.2d at 1071, 1076. For discussion on B.D.
Int'l Discount, see supra notes 64, 94.
148. Ross, 63 Bankr. at 964.
149. Id. at 961.
150. Id.; see also In re B.B.S.I., Ltd., 81 Bankr. 227, 230-31 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(applying the balancing test proposed in Ross to support the conclusion that the petitioning
creditors' claims were subject to a bona fide dispute).
151. Ross, 63 Bankr. at 964-65.
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303(h)(1) purposes. Regrettably, Judge Abram failed to further embellish
this notion in Ross and it has been largely ignored in the subsequent
decisional law. 52 Moreover, in a later opinion, 53 Judge Abram considered
the finding of an absence of a bona fide dispute for purposes of section
303(b) conclusive with respect to whether or not those claims would be
included in the "generally not paying" analysis under section 303(h)(1). 54
However, as I argue in the final part of this Article, such a distinction is
not only rational in light of the policy objectives underlying involuntary
bankruptcy, it is consistent with the legislative purpose and the actual
experience which account for section 303 in both its original and present
forms.
VI. ASSESSING THE IMPACT AND WISDOM OF THE 1984
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 303
Five years later, it is worthwhile to appraise how effectively the 1984
amendments directed to section 303 have responded to the articulated
concerns and objectives which prompted their adoption. Certainly, there
can be no doubt that the mandatory exclusion under section 303 of claims
and debts subject to a bona fide dispute has "upped the ante" for creditors
considering resort to the involuntary bankruptcy remedy. Statistical infor-
mation collected and maintained by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts indicates that the number of involuntary filings has dropped
steadily in recent years. ' 5 This reduction in the volume of involuntary cases,
which shows every sign of continuing, should come as no surprise. Under
the original 1978 version of section 303, petitioning creditors in involuntary
cases already pulled the laboring oar in what amounted to a demanding
152. But see In re Elsub Corp., 70 Bankr. 797, 814 (Bankr. S.D.N.J. 1987), wherein the
court referred to certain of the above-quoted portions of Ross, but only for the apparent
purpose of suggesting that the Stroop test, at least in some contexts, may be too strict and
demanding a standard for defining when a debt is subject to a bona fide dispute; see also
Tikijian, 76 Bankr. at 315 ("In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the issues raised
on a motion for summary judgment are not coextensive with the question of whether a claim
is the subject of a bona fide dispute.").
153. Tikijian, 76 Bankr. at 304.
154. Id. at 321.
155. Figures from the Administrative Office indicate that for the years 1982-85 ending June
30 (commencing just prior to the effective date of the amendment to § 303), the total number
of involuntary Chapter 7 and 11 cases, expressed as a percentage of total filings, were as
follows: forty-two hundredths of one percent (0.42%), forty-five hundredths of one percent
(0.45%), forty-two hundredths of one percent (0.42%), and forty-four hundredths of one
percent (0.44%). The corresponding figures for the years 1986 (the first full year under
amended § 303) through 1988 ending June 30, were as follows: twenty-eight hundredths of
one percent (0.28%), twenty-nine hundredths of one percent (0.29%), and twenty-three hun-
dredths of one percent (0.23%). See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (1987) (available on request from the Office of Public
Information).
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and potentially expensive piece of litigation.'5 6 In most cases, debtors had
every incentive to vigorously resist the petition. On top of that, petitioning
creditors have always been subject to the risk of affirmative liability in the
event that the debtor is successful in obtaining a dismissal of the petition.'5 7
On the other hand, notwithstanding the added burden and risk assumed,
petitioning creditors receive no favored treatment or other special advantage
in the bankruptcy administration which follows entry of an order for relief
on an involuntary petition. 5
The 1984 amendments have now further discouraged involuntary filings.
By complicating the petitioners' proof, and adding to the statutory bases
upon which a debtor might controvert and defend a petition, Congress has
made the prosecution of involuntary filings an even more difficult and
perilous affair. While there is no question that the 1984 amendments have
reduced the number of involuntary filings, that the placement of these
additional obstacles in the path of involuntary relief was warranted, or that
they represent a necessary or inevitable price to be paid to achieve other
important policy objectives, is a far more debatable proposition.
As a starting place, it is revealing to recall the reasons which first
prompted reform of the law and procedure governing involuntary bank-
ruptcy in 1978.1 9 It is interesting, if not ironic, to note that it was the
perceived need to simplify the issues in involuntary cases, and thereby
promote their prompt and effective disposition, that persuaded the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code to lower the barriers which had frustrated creditors'
access to bankruptcy relief under the 1898 Act.'16
156. In a controverted case, the pre-trial and trial procedures governing litigation of an
involuntary petition are essentially the same as those governing any federal civil action. See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1018 (which makes the federal discovery rules applicable in involuntary
cases). See generally S. SNYDER & L. PONOROIF, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LTGATIoN § 5.12
(1989) (discussion of the procedures governing the disposition of involuntary petitions).
157. See I1 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). At the court's discretion, the petitioning
creditors may also be required to, as a condition to going forward with their case, post a
bond to indemnify the debtor for such amounts as the court may later determine are due to
the debtor under § 303(i). 11 U.S.C. § 303(e) (1982).
158. After entry of an order for relief on an involuntary petition, the manner in which the
case proceeds is indistinguishable from a routine voluntary case, which is to say that the claims
of the petitioning creditor are treated without preference to the comparable claims of all other
similarly situated non-petitioning creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1129 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), which, in terms of priority, order of distribution, and plan confirmation requirements,
make no.special provision for petitioning creditors in an involuntary case. However, successful
petitioning creditors may seek reimbursement for actual costs and expenses incurred in obtaining
an order for relief by filing an administrative expense claim for such amounts under §
503(b)(3)(A), (b)(4).
159. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126, 133-36 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); BANKRUPTCY CoMassIoN REPORT, supra note 38
at 186-89.
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After just a few years of experience under the Code, and without any
apparent study, Congress decided to tinker with the new statutory scheme.
As discussed earlier,' 6' the sponsor of the 1984 Act's amendments to section
303 cited two principal reasons for explicit inclusion of the exclusionary
language concerning disputed debts: 1) misuse of the bankruptcy system as
a tool of coercion; and 2) judicial misinterpretation and uncertainty over
the proper treatment under section 303 of debts that were subject to good
faith dispute. 62 The first of these justifications could hardly be characterized
as blazing virgin trails. While the potentially devastating consequences of
an involuntary filing on a debtor's business make the concern over improper
or malicious filings an important one, it was not a concern as to which the
drafters of the 1978 version of section 303 were oblivious. However, the
balance struck at the time was to discourage, control and punish such
practices without, in the process, compromising the countervailing and
equally salient concern over the right of creditors to compel an involuntary
proceeding when bankruptcy court protection is needed. Furthermore, lest
that right exist in name only, it was understood that creditors' ability to
initiate a bankruptcy administration had to be freed of the prejudicial
constraints resulting from requirements involving intricate and arduous issues
of proof and posing the prospect for protracted litigation over the petition.
63
The drafters compensated for the 1978 Code's liberalized criteria for
seeking and obtaining involuntary relief in two important ways. First, in
the "gap period" between the filing of the petition and entry of an order
for relief, section 303(f) has always allowed the debtor to retain control of
and operate its business free of Bankruptcy Code restriction or regulation.
164
This autonomy granted to the debtor over the conduct of its own affairs
reduces the unsettling effect which the filing of an even non-meritorious
161. 130 CONG. REc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus); see supra
text accompanying note 99.
162. Id. Specifically, Senator Baucus maintained:
I believe this amendment, although a simply [sic] one, is necessary to protect
the rights of debtors and to prevent misuse of the bankruptcy system as a tool
of coercion. I also believe it corrects a judicial misinterpretation of existing law
and congressional intent as to the proper basis for granting involuntary relief.
Id.
163. See BANKRUPTCY CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 38, at 188; In re Covey, 650 F.2d
877, 882 (7th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
164. Generally, it is not until entry of the order for relief that the constraints imposed on
the use or disposition of property of the estate imposed by § 363 become applicable. 11 U.S.C.
§ 363 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). However, where it appears that the debtor may conceal or
abscond with assets of the estate, or dispose of them in some manner detrimental to the
creditors' interests, the debtor's rights during the gap period may be restricted by the court.
See 11 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1982); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmwr. NEws 5787, 5819; H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 323,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6279. This represents a significant
change from operation of involuntary bankruptcy under the Act. See § 70a of the Act which
vests all title to the debtor's property in the trustee as of the date of filing.
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petition might otherwise have on the orderly operation of the debtor's
business. In addition, the Code provides substantial protection for creditors
who continue to deal with the debtor during the gap period.' 65 This overall
attempt to preserve the status quo pending a disposition on the petition was
a clear departure from practice under the former Bankruptcy Act, and was
purposefully designed to protect debtors from ill-conceived and spitefully
motivated petitions.66
The second, and arguably more important, reform which was incorporated
into the original drafting of section 303 has already been mentioned. It
involved the conferral of substantial discretion on bankruptcy judges to
award the debtor fees and costs upon the dismissal of an involuntary
petition other than on the consent of all of the parties. 67 Furthermore, if
the debtor can establish that the petition was filed in bad faith, the court
has always had the authority under the Code to award compensatory and
punitive damages to the debtor for harm caused by the filing.' 68
The protections contained in section 303(i), also without direct counterpart
under the Act, were intended to deter creditor abuse of the involuntary
bankruptcy process which might otherwise have resulted from the Code's
elimination of the requirement that the petitioning creditors plead and prove
the commission of one of the specific "acts of bankruptcy."'' 69 In identifying
what criteria might support a finding of bad faith, the courts have uniformly
held that the filing of an involuntary petition solely as a substitute for the
routine collection remedies and devices provided by state law is actionable.
170
Therefore, the concern about the "unintended inequity in the law of
165. 11 U.S.C. § 549(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) operates to shield from the trustee's
avoiding powers post-petition transfers of the debtor's property to creditors who extend new
value in the gap period. Further, if a gap period creditor's claim arising in the ordinary course
is not repaid before the order for relief is entered, that claim is entitled to priority in
distribution over other general creditors' claims in the ensuing bankruptcy administration. 11
U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), 502(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
166. See BANsRuuPTcY CoMMIltSSbON REPORT, supra note 38, at 189-90 (discussing the lack of
protection for gap creditors under the former Bankruptcy Act). Compare § 70d of the former
Act (restricting protection of post-filing transferees to those without knowledge or who had
reasonable cause for believing that the petition was unfounded) with § 549(b) of the Code
(protecting all post-petition transferees that take for value).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 204(1) (now codified
in 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) (eliminating § 303(i)(1)(c))). Costs and attorneys' fees
may be awarded under § 303(i)(1) regardless of whether the petition is found to have been
filed without just cause or in bad faith. See, e.g., In re Leach, 102 Bankr. 805, 808 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1989).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (1982). Petitioning creditors' potential liability upon the dismissal
of an involuntary petition is discussed in S. SNYDER & L. PoNoRo , supra note 156, § 5.14.
169. See All Media, 5 Bankr. at 135 (provisions of § 303(i) "are new, did not appear in
the Bankruptcy Act, and should be sufficient to deter those who would bring frivolous petitions
against the debtors." (citing BANKRUPTCY COMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 190)).
170. See, e.g., In re F.R.P. Indus., 73 Bankr. 309, 313 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re
Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 Bankr. 361, 367 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987); In re SBA Factors of
Miami, 13 Bankr. 99, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
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involuntary bankruptcies," which was offered as one of the principal
justifications for the 1984 amendments to section 303,171 had already been
addressed by the existing language of the Code and by the courts' willingness
to construe that language broadly in protecting the integrity of their own
jurisdiction.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the concern over the potential
for misuse of the bankruptcy system to coerce payment of validly disputed
debts had been addressed in a less than adequate or satisfactory manner.
Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1984 Act is there (nor was there
in the literature up to that time) any evidence that the reforms in 1978
which had encouraged the earlier initiation of involuntary cases had also
spawned a rash of either careless or abusive filings. In fact, the original
version of section 303 appeared to fairly balance the somewhat contradictory
goals of creating a more effective and equitable system of creditor relief
without unduly exposing business debtors to an excessive risk of creditor
misbehavior. In short, when considered in light of the actual circumstances
which existed at the time, the facially acceptable explanation of the 1984
amendments to section 303 as necessary to "protect the rights of debtors,' 7 2
begins to lose its convincing and appealing ring.
Similarly, the 1984 amendments to section 303 have not meaningfully, or
even perceptibly, alleviated the interpretational problems, uncertainty, and
judicial disagreement surrounding the treatment of disputed debts under
section 303. Rather, the new statutory language has operated simply to
recast the manner in which the issue arises and is debated. Instead of
addressing the disputed debts question in the guise of whether the debtor's
counterclaims and defenses should be recognized at all, the courts are now
faced with the even more vexing task of finding the proper standards for
identifying the presence or absence of a so-called bona fide dispute. More-
over, the inquiry into a proper definition of a debt subject to a bona fide
dispute may be nothing more than a thinly disguised way of addressing the
original question of how much significance should be attached to the
assertion of alleged defenses or counterclaims to particular creditor claims. 7 1
171. 130 CONG. Rsc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus); see supra
text accompanying note 99; see also In re Stroop, 47 Bankr. 986, 988 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)
(suggesting that the accelerated effectiveness of the 1984 Act's provisions amending § 303
might be explained as necessary to protect debtors in pending cases from "inequitable
treatment").
172. See supra text accompanying note 99.
173. The fact that many of the decisions addressing this issue may be explainable only in
terms of result-oriented reasoning does not mean that the change in the underlying legal
doctrine has had no impact on the outcome of particular cases. Clearly, cases which would
have been resolved favorably to the petitioning creditors prior to the effective date of the
amendments to § 303 have gone the other way. For example, it would be impossible to dispute
that the Seventh Circuit's shift in position concerning the treatment of disputed debts under
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If the net impact of the amendments to section 303 was simply that they
failed to provide greater certainty in the law or to offer more protection
for debtors, one might have concluded that no real harm was done. But
there has been a cost. It comes in the form of added reason for creditors
to hesitate to seek bankruptcy relief before the debtor becomes hopelessly
insolvent, and while preferential and other voidable transfers may still be
recovered. Such excessive restraint frustrates core bankruptcy policy of
maximizing value through orderly and equitable debt collection procedures.
An equally damaging by-product of the amendments is the courts' aban-
donment of the sensible distinction which previously prevailed in relation
to the disputed debts question. For the most part, 74 the post-1984 cases no
longer exhibit any concern over the purpose for which the inquiry regarding
the validity of claims is being raised.
For all of these reasons, I will argue in the material that follows that the
bankruptcy courts should consider articulating and applying a more content-
neutral approach for determining when a debtor's alleged dispute to a claim
rises to the level of a "bona fide" dispute. Additionally, I will contend
that this determination should be made in a manner which is responsive to
the policies and purposes of involuntary bankruptcy and tempered by an
appreciation for the context under section 303 in which the issue arises.
Finally, although I chart a different course from those followed by the
majority of courts to date, I will show that my proposals do not ignore or
contradict either the express commands of the amended statute or the
legislative explanation for the amendments.
§ 303(h)(1) from Covey to Busick has had and will continue to have an impact. The point,
however, is that, in the close case, it is not surprising to see a court deviate from the articulated
standards in order to accomplish a just result. Judge Abram's adoption of a case-by-case
approach for developing a definition of the phrase "bona fide dispute" in varying factual
situations reflects perhaps the most honest admission of this fact. See In re Drexler, 56 Bankr.
960, 967 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); supra note 130 and accompanying text.
As an additional illustration, it is instructive to compare the similarity in the nature of the
claims and defenses in In re Lough, 57 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), and In re
Tikijian, 76 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In each case the debtor raised factual
allegations concerning oral understandings affecting the nature and scope of the debtor's
asserted liability under written guaranty agreements. In Lough, applying its expanded summary
judgment test, the court considered such allegations sufficient to render the debtor's liability
subject to a bona fide dispute. Lough, 57 Bankr. at 997-98. By contrast, the court in Tikijian,
applying a very similar standard, reached just the opposite result. Tikijian, 76 Bankr. at 315-
20. While it is of course possible to justify, as the courts in fact did, the results in each case
by reference to the apparent objective merits of the defenses, which were obviously more
compelling in Lough than Tikijian, it is equally plausible to suggest that, perhaps, the differing
outcomes are best explained based on the seemingly transparent and self-serving nature of the
debtor's contentions in Tikijian as compared with Lough. In any event, while these cases may
be distinguished from one another on the facts, overall it is hard to see how doctrinally the
amendments have added much in terms of interpretational certainty or clarity.
174. The Ross court's acknowledgement that, in the final analysis, the debtor's real protection
is found in § 303(h), is one of the few exceptions to this statement. In re Ross, 63 Bankr.
951, 961 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
1990]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
VII. EXISTENCE OF A BONA FIDE DISPUTE: AN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Under the 1978 version of section 303, the courts generally agreed that
it made a difference why the bona fide dispute issue was raised. Unques-
tionably, that appreciation has been abandoned since the amendment of the
statute in 1984. Given the legislative history to amended section 303, it is
perhaps understandable that the courts have routinely applied the same
standard in defining a bona fide dispute for purposes of both sections
303(b) and 303(h)(1). However, that legislative history consists of only a
single statement on the Senate floor by the sponsor of the amendment; a
statement which not only presumes a set of existing problems that are
unsubstantiated by any empirical evidence, but which, in fact, may be at
odds with the actual experience under section 303 as originally drafted. 75
Thus, to understand why the courts have reacted to the amendments in this
way is one thing; to applaud the practice is quite another.
Even prior to the amendments, the courts had never been oblivious to
the problem created by an involuntary debtor's good faith dispute to a
creditor claim. In fact, particularly insofar as entitlement to relief was
concerned, the courts had largely accepted the notion that legitimately
disputed debts should be excluded from the "generally not paying" analy-
sis.176 The only really uncertain matter was then, as it is no less now, how
to define and identify a bona fide dispute. Prior to 1984, courts interpreting
section 303 were hesitant, except in the most clear-cut case, to exclude
disputed claims from the ambit of "claims" qualified under section 303(b).
However, there were both logical and justifiable reasons for this distinction.
First, the Code might be read as attaching to the term "claim" under
section 303(b) a broader meaning than the term "debt" as used in section
175. See 130 CONG. Rac. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus); see
also supra text accompanying note 99. Although Senator Baucus never indicated in his
comments that a uniform standard should necessarily be used in identifying a bona fide dispute
for all purposes under § 303, neither did he specify a contrary interpretation. Thus, the courts,
in formulating proper tests of a bona fide dispute, reacted predictably to the fact that the
amendments to §§ 303(b), 303(h)(1) were promulgated as part of the same provision of the
1984 Act, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, and are similar in content. In so doing,
they lost sight of the underlying consequences flowing from the determination; a recognition
which had largely guided the analysis under the Reform Act prior to the 1984 Act.
176. See, e.g., In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1981). The court, in describing
the current state of the law regarding disputed debts, stated: "creditors holding disputed claims
are not .. disqualified from petitioning for involuntary bankruptcy," but "a dispute can
affect whether nonpayment of a debt should be counted in determining whether a debtor is
generally paying debts as those debts become due." Id. at 878; see also In re Stroop, 51
Bankr. 210, 211 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (prior to the 1984 Act, the courts generally concurred
that the existence of a bona fide dispute would not bar the creditor from placing the debtor
in an involuntary proceeding).
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303(h)(1). 177 Second, and more importantly, the legislative history of original
section 303(b) reveals a clear intent to achieve a fairer distribution of limited
assets by relaxing the standing and proof requirements for involuntary cases
under the Bankruptcy Code. 178 In so doing, Congress sought to redress the
imbalance perceived to have existed under prior law by expanding creditor
access to bankruptcy relief.'
79
In light of this background, Senator Baucus' comments explaining the
justifications for amendment of section 303 are suspect. They ignore not
only what had earlier been identified as the foundational ill to be eradicated
in reforming the law of involuntary bankruptcy, but also the range and
varying content of the diverse judicial attitudes toward section 303 prevailing
at the time. Correspondingly, by lumping together the analysis of the bona
fide dispute issue in two very different contexts, the 1984 Act amendments
have precipitated a harmful judicial overreaction to what, at most, amounted
to a few aberrant cases and an alleged but unsubstantiated pattern of
creditor "misuse" of the bankruptcy system. The subsequent reduction in
the percentage of filings under amended section 303,180 a phenomenon very
likely attributable to the more inflexible judicial posture toward involuntary
bankruptcies bred by the new statutory language, loudly signals a return to
the pre-1978 days of "creditor dissatisfaction and lack of interest" in the
bankruptcy system.' By interpreting the statute in a manner which vastly
complicates creditors' difficulties of proof and, therefore, increases the costs
and risks associated with seeking bankruptcy relief, courts have largely
177. Courts have read "claim" and "debt" differently in other contexts. For example, in
In re Lambert, 43 Bankr. 913, 918 (Bahkr. D. Utah 1984), the court held that, in applying
the debt limitations in § 109(e) governing eligibility to Chapter 13 relief, the term "claim"
has a broader meaning than "debt." Id. Thus, the argument can be made that, by definition,
a "claim" includes a disputed obligation, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982), but that since a debt is
defined as "liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982), use of the term "debt"
necessarily implies a congressional intent to limit the focus of the analysis to nondisputed
claims. But see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE-
CONG. & ADxn. NEws 5963, 6267 (terms "claim" and "debt" are coextensive); Energy
Coop., Inc. v. SOCAP Int'l, Ltd. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 832 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1987);
New York Credit Adjustment Bureau v. Just In-Materials Designs (In re Vasu Fabrics), 39
Bankr. 513, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The differences in these [two] terms are [merely]
ones of point of view .... ").
178. See generally In re North County Chrysler Plymouth, 13 Bankr. 393, 399 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1981) ("By eliminating the need to have a provable, liquidated claim, the Congress
has stated a policy in favor of a liberal taking of jurisdiction in involuntary cases.").
179. Id. at 396 ("The history of the language of § 303(b)(1) reflects a gradual easing of the
requirements imposed upon the petitioning creditor."); see also supra note 36 for citation of
authority criticizing practice under the former Bankruptcy Act; ef. BANCKRIu'TcY CoZMMssIoN
REPORT, supra note 38, at 188 ("Under the present Act, it is easy for a creditor to initiate an
involuntary proceeding.").
180. See supra note 155 for an actual statistical breakdown relative to the number of
involuntary filings as a percentage of total filings both before and after the 1984 Act.
181. See BANKRurTcY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 187-88.
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neutralized any benefits that creditors might have otherwise gained by resort
to the involuntary bankruptcy remedy.
It is submitted that such a result is wrong and that the 1984 amendments
to section 303 should be interpreted and applied with attention to the prior
history and experience of involuntary bankruptcy under the Act and the
early Code. While this might necessarily entail discounting to some degree
the significance of the only extant expression of legislative intent, there are
no formal committee reports explaining the language of amended section
303 and, as a matter of statutory construction, individual floor statements
are generally regarded as far less definitive expressions of congressional
intent than committee reports. 8 2 Moreover, when equity and common sense
demand, the judiciary is not bound to honor exogenous statements of
purpose and intent when construing specific legislative enactments. 8 3
Prior to the 1984 Act, courts generally recognized the existence of
jurisdiction over petitions filed by creditors holding disputed claims, but
then took the existence of such disputes into account in ruling on the merits
of the petition.8 4 This system, as even the sponsor of the amendment
admitted, had "proved to be both workable and fair in practice." ' 5 Thus,
it is logical to construe the amendments as refashioning the existing practice
to the least extent possible consistent with their aim, thereby avoiding the
mistake of fixing something which wasn't broken.
182. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186-87 (1969) (expressing a clear preference
for committee reports over floor debates); Meade Township v. Andrus, 695 F.2d 1006, 1011
(6th Cir. 1982).
183. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (comments of single legislator, even
the sponsor, are not binding or controlling in analyzing legislative history); Railroad Comm'n
v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1921).
[E]xplanatory statements of members in charge made in presenting a bill for
passage have been held to be a legitimate aid to the interpretation of a statute
where its language is doubtful or obscure. But when taking the Act as a whole,
the effect of the language used is clear to the Court, extraneous aids like this
can not control the interpretation. Such aids are only admissible to solve doubt
and not to create it.
Id. at 589 (citations omitted); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989),
in which Judge Easterbrook cogently discusses the uses and role of legislative history, con-
cluding:
An opinion poll revealing the wishes of Congress would not translate to legal
rules. Desires become rules only after clearing procedural hurdles, designed to
encourage deliberations and expose proposals (and arguments) to public view and
recorded vote. Resort to "intent" as a device to short-circuit these has no more
force than the opinion poll-less, because the legislative history is written by the
staff of a single committee and not subject to a vote or veto.
Id. at 1343-44.
184. See supra notes 52-97 and accompanying text.
185. The quoted language forms a part of Senator Baucus' statement regarding the amend-
ments to § 303. See 130 CoNG. REc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Baucus); see also supra text accompanying note 99.
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A. Determining a Bona Fide Dispute Under Section 303(b)
Given the clear and direct language of amended section 303(b), it is
difficult to dispute that by virtue of the 1984 Act Congress overruled the
practice established in In re All Media Properties, Inc. of including nearly
all disputed claimholders in the category of creditors eligible to invoke the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction under section 303(b).116 However, as recog-
nized in cases decided both before and after enactment of the amendment
to section 303,187 a debtor's primary protection against a non-meritorious
petition is and properly should be found in the assessment of whether or
not proper grounds for relief exist under section 303(h). Moreover, it bears
reiterating that a substantial deterrent against improperly conceived or
abusive filings still exists in the form of section 303(i). Therefore, it is a
mistake to read the amendment to section 303(b) as authorizing as abrupt
a departure from prior practice as achieved by strict application of the tests
articulated in either In re Stroop5 s or In re Lough.189 There is simply no
compelling reason why a creditor should be required to shoulder the heavy
burden of proving the absence of any material issue of fact or law bearing
on the debtor's liability solely as a condition to having the merits of an
involuntary petition heard. 90
The underlying question of the debtor's ultimate liability on any particular
creditor's claim, whether disputed or not, is never the matter directly at
186. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 646
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the All Media decision, see supra notes 52-74
and accompanying text.
187. See All Media, 5 Bankr. at 144 ("[T]he court believes that where a debtor fails to pay
a debt which is subject to a bona fide dispute that debt should not be considered a debt which
has not been paid as it became due."); In re Ross, 63 Bankr. 951, 961 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986).
188. 51 Bankr. at 210.
189. 57 Bankr. 993 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
190. To be sure, some of the reported decisions which have expressly addressed the matter
do indeed suggest that the petitioning creditors bear the burden of establishing their claims
for purposes of § 303(b) with a degree of certainty that would warrant summary relief in a
conventional civil case. For example, in In re Hope Communications, Inc., 59 Bankr. 939,
943-44 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986), the court held that the petitioning creditors' failure to establish
the absence of a bona fide dispute with regard to their claims against the debtor was grounds
to dismiss the petition. See also In re Charon, 94 Bankr. 403, 406 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)
(petitioning creditor failed to meet its burden of proving that it satisfied the jurisdictional
requirements of § 303(b)); cf. In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1987) (debtor's
assertion of defenses which raised a reasonable contention "as to the application of law to
undisputed facts" was sufficient to render the petitioning creditors' claims subject to a bona
fide dispute for purposes of §§ 303(b) and 303(h)(1) (quoting In re Lough, 57 Bankr. at 997));
infra note 214 and accompanying text (addressing the parallel question of which party bears
the burden of proof with respect to the absence of a bona fide dispute element under §
303(h)(1)).
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issue at the trial of an involuntary petition.1 9' Therefore, it is puzzling that
the petitioning creditors have been required at any point in the process of
obtaining an order for relief to establish the absence of all factual or legal
barriers to the debtor's liability on their claims. The rationale becomes even
more attenuated in the context of section 303(b) where the purpose for the
inquiry into the bona fide dispute issue is much narrower and more limited
than the ultimate question of whether or not an involuntary case should go
forward. The only question which actually turns on resolution of the bona
fide dispute issue for section 303(b) purposes is the more-or-less procedural
one of eligibility to invoke the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.
Viewed from that perspective, it would be consistent with both conven-
tional civil practice and the original legislative history of section 303 to
treat the debtor's contradiction of a petitioning creditor's claim as an
affirmative legal defense to that creditor's entitlement to maintain suit for
involuntary relief. As such, the debtor would ordinarily be responsible not
only for challenging the validity of the claim, but would also bear the
ultimate burden of showing the existence of a bona fide dispute. In fact,
some courts have stated, or at least implied, that the petitioning creditors'
burden under section 303(b) is limited to pleading 92 or perhaps even
establishing a prima facie case that their claims are not subject to a bona
fide dispute, but that thereafter the burden of coming forward with evidence
of such a dispute shifts to the debtor. 93 Presumably, where the debtor is
191. That Congress intended in the original drafting of § 303 to eliminate protracted
litigation over involuntary petitions is beyond question. See BANKRUPTCY CommssboN REPORT,
supra note 38, at 188; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. It is equally clear that,
whatever its effect, the purpose of the 1984 Act's amendment to § 303 was to reinforce, not
to deviate from that original intent. See 130 CONG. REc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Baucus). Senator Baucus' statement, see supra text accompanying note 99,
suggests that the amendment corrects a "judicial misinterpretation of ... congressional intent
as to the proper basis for granting involuntary relief." 130 CONG. REc. at S7618.
192. See, e.g., Equidyne Properties, 60 Bankr. 245, 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also
In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 88 Bankr. 459, 462-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (petitioner's failure
to plead the absence of a bona fide dispute may be waived by the debtor; however, the debtor
must affirmatively set forth any affirmative defenses or counterclaims before they will be
considered by the court (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 1018, 7008)); In re Tikijian, 76 Bankr.
304, 308 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (It is essential that the original petition contain the
allegation that the petitioner's claims are not the subject of a bona fide dispute.).
193. See, e.g., In re Garland Coal & Mining Co., 67 Bankr. 514, 521 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1989) (citing In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Bartmann v. Maverick Tube
Corp., 853 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1988), in which the court, while adopting the Lough test for
determining a bona fide dispute under § 303(b), nevertheless approvingly cited Garland Coal's
statement regarding allocation of the burden for establishing a bona fide dispute and, for that
reason, refused to deny a petitioning creditor's standing where the debtor had failed to "make
a clear showing that the [creditor's] debt was time-barred." Id. at 1544-45. Thus, the court
in Bartmann, as has been true in some other instances, simply overlooked the fact that the
Lough formulation originated as a variation on the Stroop test which unequivocally adopted
a summary judgment-like standard of proof for the petitioning creditors; cf. Tikiian, 76
Bankr. at 315 (the issues raised on a summary judgment motion and the question of whether
a claim is subject to a bona fide dispute are not identical).
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unable to make this showing, the petitioning creditor's standing would
remain intact.
Establishing how the issue is joined and on whom the evidentiary burdens
rest does not complete the analysis of the proper standard for identifying
a bona fide dispute under section 303(b). The fact still remains that the
trial on an involuntary petition is not the proper forum for extensive
litigation over individual claims and defenses. Therefore, as the courts have
long appreciated, a more mechanical test than adjudication on the merits
must be found for evaluating a debtor's challenge to a petitioning creditor's
standing which is based on the existence of alleged counterclaims and
defenses to the creditor's claim. Happily, such a test is readily and easily
available. It involves nothing more than a modification of the primary
standards already developed by the courts.
As earlier considered, the Stroop court held that a defense to the claim
of the petitioning creditor would be sufficient to render the claim subject
to a bona fide dispute where such a defense raised issues of fact which
would bar judgment in the creditor's favor. 194 The Lough court then revised
the standard by adding that, even in the absence of factual disputes sufficient
to preclude summary judgment, a bona fide dispute could still be created
by a meritorious contention as to the proper application of governing legal
principles to those facts. 95 These tests are basically sound. Their only
drawback is that they are verbally backward in formulation.
A debtor should not be able to avoid bankruptcy and defeat the objectives
served by the federal bankruptcy system simply by raising unsubstantiated
theories of law, or by averring the minimum factual allegations necessary
to avoid summary judgment. Instead, bearing in mind that federal bank-
ruptcy legislation is not designed solely or even primarily to serve the needs
and protect the interests of debtors alone, 96 the debtor challenging a petition
on this ground should be required to make an extraordinary showing to
justify denying a creditor's access to involuntary relief. 197
Accordingly, under a better interpretation of the amendment to section
303(b), the term "bona fide dispute" would be narrowly construed. Unless
194. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
196. Working for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor, the federal bankruptcy
laws are designed "to take charge of the property of insolvent debtors through proceedings in
bankruptcy courts, divide their property among their creditors in proportion to their claims,
and grant to bankruptcy debtors discharge from further liability for their debts." A. SELVER-
STONE, supra note 16, at 2; see also T. JACKSON, supra note 14, ch. 1.
197. Some courts have followed this recommendation in practice, but continue to pay
homage to the Lough summary judgment "plus" test. See, e.g., In re BDW Assocs., 75
Bankr. 909, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (court stated that in order for the debtor to prevail
on its request for dismissal it must present "sufficient proof to contradict the Petitioning
Creditor's claims . . ."), aff'd, B.D.W. Assocs. v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, 865 F.2d 65
(3d Cir. 1989); see also supra note 193.
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the debtor's defenses would be sufficient to entitle the debtor to summary
judgment dismissing the creditor's claim as a matter of law, taking into
account the status of any pre-petition litigation, the petition would be heard
on its merits. In other words, the summary judgment analysis would be
transposed from a plaintiff's to a defendant's motion. Furthermore, even
when the facts entitling the debtor to such relief are undisputed, the
petitioning claimholder should not be rendered ineligible from seeking
involuntary relief if that creditor can demonstrate a serious contention as
to the application of the governing legal principles to undisputed facts. In
this way, the prime goal of the Reform Act, preventing protracted and
wasteful litigation over involuntary petitions, 98 would be served without
sacrificing the equally important Reform Act objective of making involun-
tary bankruptcy relief a viable alternative for creditors when prompt and
efficient liquidation or reorganization of the debtor's assets is warranted.
Thus, several benefits result from reversing the parties' positions under
the existing judicial standards. Additionally, the proposed standard offers
a construction of the 1984 amendment to section 303(b) which refines, but
does not radically alter, what before the amendment had been a reasonably
uniform interpretation of the standing rule for involuntary cases. 99 This
result is particularly desirable since that previous interpretation had formed
an integral component in the operation of a reformed system governing
involuntary bankruptcy which had not only been working, but, concededly,
had been working fairly well. 2°°
Certainly, adoption of this approach would be consonant with the holding
in In re Drexler20 that where final judgment had already been entered in
the creditor's favor prior to the bankruptcy filing, the debtor's disputes as
to either the law or the facts cannot create a bona fide dispute. 20 2 Similarly,
as many courts have held both before and after the 1984 amendments to
section 303, defenses going solely to the amouht of a creditor's claim would
not be enough to cause such claims to be treated as being the subject of a
bona fide dispute. 20 3 Finally, and also in harmony with the court's reasoning
in Drexler, counterclaims, even if of substance, would not be enough to
cast a petitioning creditor's claim into sufficient doubt to deprive that
198. See generally supra note 163.
199. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200. See 130 CONG. Rc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("For
the most part, Section 303 has proved to be both workable and fair in practice."); see also
supra text accompanying note 99.
201. 56 Bankr. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
202. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. Consistent with the analogy to conven-
tional civil practice, once judgment has been entered, the debtor's "summary judgment motion"
would have no place.
203. See generally In re Covey, 650 F.2d at 883; In re Sea Island Resorts, 82 Bankr. 404,
406 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987); In re Braten, 74 Bankr. 1021, 1022 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re
Galaxy Boat Mfg., 72 Bankr. 200, 202-03 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986).
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creditor of standing to prosecute the case. 204 Therefore, a petitioning creditor
would be denied standing only where the debtor asserted meritorious de-
fenses which were capable of being established without the need for extensive
discovery or an expanded evidentiary hearing.
To be sure, the All Media decision had recognized the potential of such
"airtight defenses," and indicated a willingness to credit them for section
303(b) purposes. 205 However, many of the pre-1984 decisions which relied
on All Media cited its holding as supporting a rule of blanket inclusion of
disputed claims under section 303(b). 206 Furthermore, among those courts
prepared to distinguish types of disputes, there was certainly no consensus
over what kind of defense rose to a level of seriousness sufficient to exclude
a claimholder from eligibility to file an involuntary petition. 207 In fact, since
it was not necessary to the holding in the case, even the All Media court
itself was less than entirely clear about the types of defenses which might
form a valid basis to challenge a petitioning creditor's standing.2°5
Thus, the proposal advanced above for interpreting amended section
303(b) would clarify the practice for dealing with disputed debts and, without
placing creditors in undue jeopardy, would further regulate the filing of
truly spiteful or malicious petitions. In so doing, this test would not only
continue to give meaning to the new statutory language regarding disputed
claims, but would attach a meaning which does not directly contradict the
brief legislative history.209 On the other hand, this approach, unlike most
of the current standards, would not unduly restrict the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction over involuntary petitions as the price to be paid for solving a
204. Accord In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 88 Bankr. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
205. See All Media, 5 Bankr. at 135-36; supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
206. Several pre-1984 decisions casually cited All Media for the proposition that all disputed
claimholders were entitled to seek a determination of whether or not grounds for involuntary
relief existed. See, e.g., Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The
well-reasoned holding of All Media Properties was that a bona fide dispute over liability does
not render a claim contingent."); Covey, 650 F.2d at 881 (holders of disputed claims are not
barred from being petitioning creditors); In re First Energy Leasing Corp., 38 Bankr. 577, 581
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (under the analysis in All Media, the holders of any of the types of
claims enumerated in § 101(4)(A), except those contingent as to liability, qualify to be petitioning
creditors under § 303(b)); In re R.N. Salem Corp., 29 Bankr. 424, 428 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (the
Code does not bar holders of disputed claims from being petitioning creditors).
207. See generally supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussion of the discrepant
treatment accorded disputed debts under § 303(b) prior to the 1984 Act).
208. For example, what is conventionally considered as among the most cut-and-dry of legal
defenses-that a claim is time-barred by the governing statute of limitations-was itself rejected
in All Media as a sufficient defense to bar a creditor's participation in an involuntary petition.
All Media, 5 Bankr. at 140; see also Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1544-45 (limitations defense does
not preclude creditor from being a petitioning creditor).
209. While Senator Baucus' statement makes clear that "an involuntary petition could not
be based on debts that are the subject of a good-faith dispute between the debtor and his or
her creditors ... " it does not address at all the related issue of which of the parties has the
burden of establishing good faith. See 130 CONG. Rac. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Baucus).
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problem which, from all outward appearances, had mostly been solved
already in the original drafting of section 303.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if limited in application to the
creditor standing issue, this proposal would not ease the showing that
petitioning creditors are required to make in order to obtain an order for
relief. It is to that latter, and, as has been repeatedly stressed, separable
aspect of the disputed debts question that attention is focused upon next.
B. Determining a Bona Fide Dispute Under Section 303(h)(1)
In contrast to some of the past approaches for dealing with disputed
debts under section 303(b), the courts evaluating the merits of involuntary
petitions have always given some weight to the debtor's allegations that its
unpaid debts were the subject of a good faith dispute. Thus, to a degree
not true with respect to section 303(b), the inclusion of the "unless subject
to a bona fide dispute" language in section 303(h)(1) can defensively be
viewed as codifying, rather than refashioning, prior case law and practice.
Initially it might be tempting to reject such an explanation as falling prey
to the cardinal sin in statutory construction of interpreting the statutory
amendment in a manner that strips it of any purpose or import. However,
that criticism would not be a fair one. Recall that, in In re Covey,210 the
Seventh Circuit adopted an approach for dealing with disputed debts under
section 303(h)(1) which required their inclusion except in a very limited
category of cases.21 This extreme view, while not rejected outright, was not
warmly endorsed by the other two circuit courts which considered the issue
under the original wording of section 303(h)(1). 212
In light of the pre-1984 disagreement over the conditions under which
disputed debts would be excluded from the generally not paying calculation,
it seems sensible to treat the inclusion of the brief, additional statutory
language to section 303(h)(1) as doing nothing more than rejecting Covey
in favor of the more lenient approaches adopted by the Second and Ninth
Circuits; both of which entailed an essentially neutral balancing of the
competing interests of the debtor and its creditors. Furthermore, this inter-
pretation is perfectly consistent with the sponsor's oration of the reasons
210. 650 F.2d at 877.
211. Id. at 883-84. The disputed debts would be excluded only where the dispute: 1) related
to the validity of the claim, 2) could be resolved without substantial litigation and 3) where
the debtor's interest in avoiding the negative impact of a bankruptcy order for relief outweighed
the creditors' interest in preventing a wasteful dissipation of the debtor's assets. See generally
supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
212. See Dill, 731 F.2d at 631-32; B.D. Int'l Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In
re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp.), 701 F.2d 1071, 1077 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830
(1983).
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for and intended operation of the amendment. 213 Therefore, ascribing to
Congress any more grandiose designs is not only unnecessary, but unwar-
ranted as well.
In practice, this approach would mean that a creditor with standing under
section 303(b) would still be required to allege and, if contested, establish
that as of the filing date the debtor was generally not paying its non-
disputed debts as they came due. 21 4 However, satisfaction of the petitioning
creditors' burden would be measured under a flexible and liberal standard.215
In this regard, "non-disputed" would certainly include debts contested only
as to amount, 21 6 as well as debts to which liability could be established on
a summary basis. 21 7 In addition, departing from most of the recent judicially-
developed standards, a debt as to which colorable but non-dispositive
defenses of fact or law had been raised could be included in the "generally
not paying" analysis as well. This follows from the belief that, even as part
of the ultimate determination of whether conditions favor administration
of the debtor's assets in a bankruptcy proceeding, there is no reason why
petitioning creditors should be required to make out a case sufficient to
support summary judgment with respect to each of the debtor's admittedly
unpaid but disputed debts. On the other hand, because different conse-
quences turn on the determination, there is good reason not to formulate
the definition of a bona fide dispute under section 303(h)(1) by simply
defaulting to the test developed under section 303(b).
213. Senator Baucus explained that need for the amendment to § 303(h)(1) arises from the
fact that "[s]ome courts have interpreted section 303's language on a debtor's general failure
to pay debts as allowing ... the granting of involuntary relief even when the debtor's reason
for not paying is a legitimate and good faith dispute over his or her liability." 130 CONG.
Rac. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus). While this statement might
be fairly viewed as describing Covey and its progeny, it is clearly not an accurate statement
of the practice for dealing with disputed debts under § 303(h)(1) adopted by, to name but a
few, the courts in All Media, B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., or Dill. See generally supra notes
94-97 and accompanying text. See also supra note 175.
214. Most of the cases decided since the amendment of § 303(h)(1) have in fact treated the
burden of establishing the absence of a bona fide dispute as an affirmative element of the
petitioners' case. See, e.g., Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81 Bankr. 738, 742 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987); In re Caucus Distribs., 83 Bankr. 921, 931 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); In re Schiliro,
64 Bankr. 422, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). Prior to the 1984 amendment, at least one court
had held that proof of a good faith "dispute" had to be established by the debtor. In re B.D.
Int'l Discount Corp., 15 Bankr. 755, 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983). However, it was generally acknowledged that the
petitioning creditors were otherwise allocated the burden of establishing the debtor's non-
payment of its current debts. See, e.g., In re Nar-Jor Enters., 6 Bankr. 584, 586 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1980). Compare supra notes 190, 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing allocation of
the burden of proof under § 303(b)).
215. See Caucus Distribs., 83 Bankr. at 921 (and authorities cited therein); see also In re
Taylor, 75 Bankr. 682 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1987), discussed infra note 222 and accompanying
text.
216. See authorities cited supra note 203.
217. Such debts would of course be included even under the current standards for defining
the existence of a bona fide dispute. See, e.g., In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1987).
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In a case where the debtor challenges the validity of a matured debt upon
which the creditor relies for relief, there would be no absolute rule of
inclusion or exclusion,28 or even a bias one way or the other. Instead, the
judgment would be made on a case-by-case basis in which the court would
be principally guided by the underlying policies of bankruptcy law. 219 Rather
than considering the merits of the competing claims or defenses, courts
would take into account the inherent tension between an innocent debtor's
interest in being free from the havoc wreaked by a non-meritorious petition
and the creditors' equally compelling interest in obtaining the protections
and safeguards afforded by bankruptcy relief before the debtor's assets have
been irretrievably dissipated. 220
It should be apparent that this suggested interpretation of amended section
303(h)(1) attributes to Congress a very limited and unambitious objective in
amending the statute; that of responding to the criticism leveled at Covey
by the Ninth Circuit and others of leaning "too heavily toward favoring
creditors', as opposed to debtors', interests. ' 2 1 However, given the pre-
vailing state of the law at the time of enactment of the 1984 Act, this
construction is a sound one. Unlike the more expansive judicial interpre-
tations, this reading of amended section 303(h)(1) avoids the potential for
a debtor to frustrate both its creditors and bankruptcy policies simply by
raising unproven allegations disputing the existence or validity of its unpaid
claims .222
218. To this point, this approach would be consistent with the view of the court in Covey
that "policy considerations ... do not unanimously support [a universal rule of] either
exclusion or inclusion of disputed debts from the 'generally not paying debts' calculation."
Covey, 650 F.2d at 882.
219. See, e.g., In re Arker, 6 Bankr. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("IT]he purpose of
an involuntary proceeding ... is to secure an equitable distribution of the assets of the alleged
debtor among all his creditors.").
220. The importance of continuing to balance the tension which exists between the need to
protect creditors and the potential harm to the targeted debtor was recognized by the court in
In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 Bankr. 823, 830-31 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985), and, to a lesser
extent, by Judge Abram in Drexler and Ross. See supra notes 139, 149 and accompanying
text.
221. Dill, 731 F.2d at 632; see also Salem, 29 Bankr. at 429.
222. In Salem, the court stated: "it was not the intention of Congress that a debtor be able
to avoid bankruptcy by merely disputing the existence or amount of a claim." Salem, 29
Bankr. at 429. While that observation was made before the amendment to § 303, there is no
basis in the legislative history or elsewhere to indicate that by amending the statute Congress
was now manifesting such an intention.
The problem of debtors disputing debts merely to avoid bankruptcy is more than a purely
hypothetical one. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recognized exactly
this concern in upholding the bankruptcy court's finding that a creditor's debt was not the
subject of a bona fide dispute in the absence of presentation of "convincing evidence of a
bona fide dispute" by the debtor. Taylor, 75 Bankr. at 684 ("otherwise any debtor could
defeat an involuntary petition under § 303(h)(1) by merely asserting that a bona fide dispute
exists."). While the court did not elaborate on what would suffice as "convincing evidence,"
quite obviously this standard would entail something considerably more than the minimal
allegations necessary to avoid a summary judgment.
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On the other hand, there is much more at stake in including disputed
debts for purposes of section 303(h)(1) than is true under section 303(b).
The finding that the debtor is generally not paying his debts ordinarily
means that he will be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.
Therefore, for the purposes of this inquiry, unlike under section 303(b), no
distinction should be made between defenses, and setoffs or counterclaims.
In many instances, the facts supporting a counterclaim could also form the
basis of a valid defense. 3 Consequently, when any explanation for non-
payment is offered, it should be factored into the analysis by the court and,
if of substance, credited accordingly.
Finally, because the appropriateness of bankruptcy relief is at issue, rather
than simply the objective merits of the claims and defenses, the court should
be able to factor into the balance the consideration of whether the debtor's
claims and defenses are being asserted in good faith.224 A "bona fide"
assertion is commonly defined as one made with honest, genuine and earnest
intent.2 Therefore, the requirement that a debtor's defense constitute a
bona fide dispute to a matured debt in order to have that debt excluded
from the generally not paying analysis should be viewed as equivalent to
the requirement imposed by section 303(i) that the creditor's petition not
be filed in "bad faith." In the latter inquiry, it is well settled case law that
courts consider the creditor's subjective motivation for filing, in addition
to making an evaluation of whether the creditor exercised reasonable care
in making the decision to initiate involuntary proceedings.226
Permitting a court to consider good faith is not to suggest that a
counterclaim or defense with little or no objective merit might alone be
223. See also FED. R. BAmRa. P. 1011(d) ("A claim against a petitioning creditor may not
be asserted in the answer except for the purpose of defeating the petition.").
224. The proposal that the court consider subjective good faith under amended § 303 was
originally advanced in Johnston Hawks, reasoning by analogy to the pre-1984 case law under
§ 303(h)(1). Johnston Hawks, 49 Bankr. at 831. Recall, however, that Johnston Hawks was
addressing the issue in the context of a challenge under § 303(b). See supra notes 103-07 and
accompanying text. The case was subsequently criticized and rejected on the basis that it could
operate to disqualify a creditor even when the debtor's defense had little or no objective merit.
See, e.g., Lough, 57 Bankr. at 996-97; Drexler, 56 Bankr. at 966-67.
225. See Ross, 63 Bankr. at 960 (citing BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 223 (Rev. 4th ed.)); see
also In re Nargassans, 103 Bankr. 446, 449-50 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which one court
acknowledges that this language suggests an inquiry into the subjective intent of the debtor,
but then declines to do so on the strength of a strained construction of the term "good faith";
that in this context it relates solely to the due inquiry standards of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011.
226. See, e.g., In re Turner, 80 Bankr. 618 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); U.S. Fidelity and Guar.
Co. v. DJF Realty & Supplies, 58 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); Basin Elec. Power
Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 Bankr. 903 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 483
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986); see also Johnston Hawks, 72 Bankr. at
367 n.2 (in the final analysis, the objective test is really a subjective one since the question of
whether or not a party has acted in bad faith is a question of fact to be decided by the court).
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sufficient to sustain or defeat an involuntary petition.227 It simply means
that the courts should be instructed to, as in many cases they actually do
anyhow, 228 consider a broad range of factors when deciding whether to enter
an order for bankruptcy relief. Moreover, under this approach courts could
sustain jurisdiction over a petition when it appeared that the debtor's
defenses, while facially of substance, were interposed merely for purposes
of delay or to unfairly favor one creditor over others.2 9
The neutral and open-ended balancing test proposed above for addressing
disputed debts in connection with the "generally not paying" issue is similar
to approaches adopted by some courts as an alternative to Covey even prior
to the amendments. 2 0 It is also a compatible extension of the balancing
analysis recommended by Judge Abram in Drexler and Ross as a final test
to be performed before entering an order for relief in an involuntary case.
Like Judge Abram's test, the proposed test would serve as a means of
ensuring that the doctrinal result reached by formalistic application of
227. This is essentially the concern that accounted for the Lough court's rejection of the
inquiry into "good faith," "fraud" and "deceit," as mandated by Johnston Hawks. Lough,
57 Bankr. at 996. However, as noted, it remains more than a little anomalous to exclude
consideration of a debtor's good faith in making a determination which is expressly made
dependent on the "bona fides" of the alleged dispute to payment.
228. Notwithstanding the way the Stroop and Lough tests are formulated in terms of putting
the burden of showing conditions sufficient to warrant summary relief on the petitioning
creditors, it is arguable that, as a practical matter, the bankruptcy courts do overlook alleged
legal and factual disputes in situations where the petitioners' right to relief seems clear and
the debtor's alleged disputes seem, if not patently frivolous, at least too coincidentally self-
serving. See Tikijian, 76 Bankr. at 304 (debtor's allegations of collateral agreements and
understanding regarding debtor's liability on contracts of guarantee held not to qualify as
bona fide disputes); In re BDW Assocs., 75 Bankr. at 909 (petitioners held eligible to seek
relief even though their claims against the debtor were dependent on a finding that the debtor
was the alter ego of an entity to whom the petitioning creditors had sold materials and
supplies). Similarly, in In re Albers, 71 Bankr. 39, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), the court
refused to credit the debtor's allegations that one of the petitioning creditor's judgment liens
had been fraudulently procured. See also discussion supra note 173.
229. This scenario is the situation which prompted the Lough court's concern over giving
into subjective motivation. See Lough, 57 Bankr. at 996-97; supra note 118. However, it also
presents an equally compelling illustration of a circumstance where entitlement to involuntary
relief should not be denied because of a purely technical application of the governing standard.
In his explanation for the 1984 amendments to § 303, Senator Baucus expressly identifies a
concern over debts which have not been paid due to a "legitimate and good faith dispute."
See supra note 213. If the debtor's "good faith" in contesting liability weighs in the debtor's
favor, then in all fairness "bad faith" should count against him.
230. See In re Dill, 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 1984); Salem, 29 Bankr. at 430 (rejecting
adoption of the Covey standard on the basis that it placed too mutch weight in favor of the
creditors' interests); see also supra notes 94-97. The position of these courts might have been
legitimately questioned at the time because of the absence of any suggestion in § 303 that
debts subject to a bona fide dispute were properly excludable in analyzing entitlement to
involuntary relief. Under the current version of § 303(h)(1) that type of criticism can no longer
be seriously entertained. Paradoxically, therefore, these cases may be even more defensible
now than they were at the time they were decided.
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general rules to particular facts does not impinge on broader underlying
policy considerations.Y
To be sure, a rule which requires balancing of competing interests based
upon consideration of a wide range of factors lacks the certainty and
predictability which a more mechanical rule would provide.232 However, it
would be wrong to read the new statutory language to section 303(h)(1) as
providing any such specific guidance. Such a scopic interpretation is not
supported by either the brief legislative history or the actual experience
which preceded the amendment. Additionally, the language of the amend-
ment is not fairly susceptible to any more generalized formulation except
perhaps for one which would unduly favor debtors' interests by forcing
creditors in every controverted case to perform the nearly insuperable task
of making a case on the debtor's liability to them strong enough to justify
a summary judgment.231 Actually, that requirement becomes even more
draconian under section 303(h)(1) than under section 303(b) since it poten-
tially entails subjecting the petitioning creditors to that kind of rigorous
burden not only with regard to their own debts, but also as to the debts
of other non-petitioning, unpaid creditors whose claims the debtor casts
into dispute through assertion of alleged defenses and offsets. Such a radical
departure from prior practice, with a consequent narrowing of creditors'
rights to obtain bankruptcy relief, could not have truly been the intent of
Congress in adding six short words to section 303(h)(1).
In sum, if the court in Covey erred by tipping the balance too heavily in
creditors' favor, it would be an equally unhealthy mistake to construe the
1984 amendment to section 303(h)(1) as doing anything more than restoring
that balance. Over the course of the normal common law process a consensus
might eventually develop which would provide basic guidelines concerning
the bona fides of some kinds of defenses in certain procedural contexts.
Drexler might even be viewed as the beginning of such a process. However,
because the purposes of involuntary bankruptcy are multifarious in nature,
and the circumstances which call for its initiation are diverse in origin, it
may be impossible to ever fully relieve the bankruptcy courts of the
responsibility for making a particularized analysis in every case.
The operation of the proposed approach for defining a bona fide dispute
under sections 303(b) and 303(h)(1) will be illustrated by a hypothetical.
Consider an unpaid seller of goods on credit who petitions for involuntary
231. See generally supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
232. See Dill, 731 F.2d at 632 ("Inclusion of disputed debts in the § 303(h)(1) generally not
paying debts calculation involves difficult policy evaluations with little legislative guidance.").
233. This is the interpretation which troubled the court in Taylor, 75 Bankr. at 684. Yet,
by construing the 1984 amendment to § 303(h)(1) in a manner which makes the assertion of
unproven counterclaims and defenses not just a factor but, for all intents and purposes, the
determinative variable in deciding whether an overdue debt will be considered unpaid, the
Lough/Busick standard presents precisely this danger.
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bankruptcy. The debtor responds with defenses based upon the alleged non-
conformity of the goods to the contract description. Prior to the 1984
amendments, the seller almost certainly had standing to invoke the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction. However, under most of the current standards,
that same creditor's standing is in serious jeopardy unless his claim has
already been finally adjudicated in state court. By contrast, under the
modified standard recommended above, standing would exist under section
303(b) unless the debtor's defense to liability could be established without
resolving either disputed questions of fact or substantial doubts about the
application of governing non-bankruptcy law to those facts.
Assuming the petition were to proceed to trial, under Covey the seller's
claim would almost undoubtedly be included for purposes of determining
whether the debtor had ceased paying his matured debts. Alternatively,
under current precedent, the claim will almost certainly be excluded in
evaluating the question of the petitioning creditor's right to relief.Y34 In
contrast, under the alternate test proposed above, the issue would have to
be resolved by the bankruptcy court taking into account the totality of
surrounding circumstances including, but not limited to, whether the debtor's
legal position has any objectively determinable legal merit.235 However, in
making its ultimate decision, the court would ultimately be guided by
considerations of whether or not the creditor's interest in an orderly pro-
cedure for liquidation of the debtor's assets outweighs the debtor's interest
in remaining free from the stigma and consequences of a bankruptcy
proceeding. In this connection, just as the creditor's good faith in seeking
relief is made relevant by section 303(i), the exclusion under section 303(h)(1)
for debts subject to "bona fide" dispute means that the debtor's motivations
in raising counterclaims and defenses must be examined as well. While it
is, of course, impossible in this hypothetical context to predict the outcome
of that process, the debtor and the creditors would at least be assured that
the decision of whether an order for relief should enter under section 303
would be made with explicit regard for both the objectives and the limita-
tions of involuntary bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
A fair and evenhanded system of involuntary bankruptcy would result
from untying the standards for defining a bona fide dispute under sections
234. In reality, of course, if the Lough/Busick standard governs, that latter determination
is probably never actually made since preliminary application of the same standard for §
303(b) purposes likely results in dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds and moots
the second inquiry.
235. See In re Ross, 63 Bankr. at 960 (articulating the existence of "any genuine and
objectively determinable legal merits" as an operative factor in the bankruptcy court's analysis
of the bona fide legal dispute issue).
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303(b) and 303(h)(1) and reformulating the test for each in a manner sensitive
to the particular inquiry being made. As noted, this would entail less of a
break with past practice than the interpretation which, for the most part,
the courts have attached to date. Also, this approach would clarify and in
some ways refine the judicially-created gloss on the original 1978 version
of the statute, without simultaneously requiring a wholesale abandonment
of five years of productive case law development. More importantly, ap-
plication of these standards for determining when a debtor's dispute to a
particular claim or debt will be regarded as a bona fide dispute under
section 303 would not necessitate the dismantling of a basic statutory system
which was deliberately and carefully crafted to strike a fair balance between
the interests of debtors and their creditors.
As the review of post-1984 Act case law has shown, there is no less
ambiguity and uncertainty about the role and impact of disputed debts in
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings since the amendment of section 303
than before. Consequently, there is room, and arguably need, for further
refinement and development in the standards for defining a bona fide
dispute. In undertaking this task and attempting to rationalize the confused
state of the current case law, the courts should be less beholden to unsub-
stantiated concerns over inequities in the system, and more sensitive to the
fundamental bankruptcy policy of ensuring the fairest and most equitable
distribution of limited assets among competing claimants. It is with that
view in mind that the foregoing proposals have been offered and it is hoped
that it will be in that spirit that they are examined and critiqued.
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